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Tax Complexity and Technology
DAVID I. WALKER*

The FederalIncome Tax Code has become increasinglycomplex over time with the
implication that many taxpayers no longer understand the connection between their
life decisions and their taxes. Some commentators have suggested that increasing
computational complexity may be attributable in part to the proliferation of tax
preparationsoftware that renders such complexity manageable atfiling time, but
otherwise does nothing to mitigate the "black box" nature of the tax system. While
such complexity and opacity undercut explicit incentives embedded in the Code,
make planning more difficult, and underminepolitical accountabilityfor taxes, they
may also reduce the inefficient distortion or deadweight loss of the income tax,
particularlywith respect to higher-income taxpayers.
This Article argues that technology represents a potential response to tax
complexity and opacity as well as a contributingfactor. It argues that tax planning
software can and likely will be used to restore 'functional transparency" to the
Code, for good or bad, alertingtaxpayers to explicit incentives, allowing taxpayers
to easily determine the tax consequences of their life decisions, and providing a
means for improvingfiscal citizenship, but also highlighting tax burdens in such a
way as to increase deadweight loss. This Article also makes the casefor government
provision or subsidization ofplanning software targetedat lower-income taxpayers.
Such a targeted approachwill help level the tax planningplayingfield and improve
the take-up of tax incentives by this population, while avoiding facilitating social
welfare reducing tax planning by higher-income taxpayers.

* Professor of Law and Maurice Poch Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University
School of Law. I thank Leigh Osofsky, Rory van Loo, Larry Zelenak and workshop
participants at Boston University School of Law, Harvard Law School, and Law and Society
for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I thank Jordan Paine (BUSL J.D. 2021) for excellent
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

It is well known that the Federal Income Tax Code has become increasingly
complex over time with the implication that many taxpayers no longer understand
the connection between their life decisions and their tax obligations. The Tax Code,
it is sometimes said, now resembles a black box.1 Some commentators argue that
increasing computational complexity of the Code is attributable in part to the
proliferation of tax preparation software.2 The idea is that tax provisions requiring
complex calculations, such as phase-outs of deductions or credits or the alternative
minimum tax, would have encountered resistance in the past when most taxpayers
filled out forms by hand. But now that most filers use tax preparation software, such
as TurboTax, or employ professional preparers who use such software, this
computational complexity is trivial and acceptable. 3
The increasing complexity of the Code creates benefits as well as costs. 4 On the
positive side, a more complex tax system can increase accuracy in the sense of
drawing sharper distinctions between taxpayers along relevant metrics, such as
ability to pay. Plus, to the extent that complexity reduces the salience of income taxes
or leads taxpayers to systematically underestimate their effective marginal tax rates
(MTRs),5 this complexity may reduce the inefficient distortion, known as excess
burden or deadweight loss, that arises when taxpayers shift their behavior away from
a taxed good or activity, in this case labor, to an untaxed activity, in this case leisure.
But there are a number of downsides to this complexity-driven opacity. 6 If the
complexity leads taxpayers to systematically overestimate their MTRs, this feature
may increase the inefficient distortion of the income tax. But even if increased
complexity and opacity have the opposite effect of reducing excess burden, there are

1. See

LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM

RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAx

1040:

TwO CHEERS FOR THE

11-38 (2013).

2. See id

3. See id
4. See infra Part II.
5. I use effective marginal tax rate, or MTR, to denote the actual impact of the next or
last dollar of income on an individual's tax liability and to distinguish this from the statutory
marginal tax rates that are easily found from tax tables or online. Statutory rates are sometimes
referred to as tax brackets. MTR is the appropriate tax rate for most decision-making. Both
MTR and statutory rate should be distinguished from the average tax rate, which is total tax
divided by total income.
6. See infra Part II.
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several negatives. The Tax Code contains many explicit incentives and subsidies.
Incentives are less effective if taxpayers who are simply responding to prompts from
TurboTax do not recognize them. Similarly, complexity and opacity increase the
difficulty of factoring taxes into major life decisions, such as buying a house or
having children. In addition, a more complex and opaque tax system may make it
easier for Congress to obfuscate tax burdens and reduce political accountability for
taxes. It is even possible that complexity and opacity could result in suboptimally
large government through the "fiscal illusion" that taxes are lower than they are in
actuality.
To be sure, whether these positive or negative effects of complexity and opacity
are real or just theoretical depends on a number of factors, such as whether taxpayers
respond to MTRs, or to what they believe to be their MTRs; whether the salience of
taxation affects behavior; whether taxpayers systematically under or overestimate
MTRs or whether their errors are random; and whether increasing complexity affects
these estimations and responses. There is a large literature on these questions, and
they remain somewhat unresolved. In short, however, the evidence suggests that
taxes do affect behavior, but salience matters, as one would expect. Taxpayersparticularly high-income taxpayers-appear to systematically underestimate MTRs,
and one would expect that the complex provisions of the Code that affect MTRs and
create opacity, such as deduction phase-outs, more often lead to underestimation of
MTRs than the reverse. Thus, while there are many open empirical questions, it
seems likely that today, complexity and opacity result in a tradeoff between reduced
excess burden of taxation, on the one hand, and impaired tax incentives, personal
planning and optimization, and perhaps political accountability, on the other.
But need this be the case, and will this continue to be the case? While a number
of commentators have argued that technology is a leading culprit in this story, this
Article argues that technology will also provide the response-that technology can
render the income tax black box functionally transparent and, to some extent, will do
so whether so doing is in the overall interest of society, or not.8
This is the first academic article to look closely at tax planning software, as
opposed to tax preparation software. 9 At the extreme, the latter renders the tax
system opaque by reducing the taxpayer to a clerk who simply inputs figures from
various documents when queried by the software. Out pops a net tax amount owed
or a tax refund figure with little or no insight into how that amount was determined.1
Tax planning software, on the other hand, can be designed to allow taxpayers to
easily run "what if' scenarios, adjusting inputs to determine the tax impact of various
life decisions, such as starting a family, taking a higher paying job, sending a kid to
college, etc. When integrated with preparation software, tax planning software could
also be designed to alert taxpayers to various tax incentives, explaining, for example,

7. See infra Part IIB.

8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.

10. This is a bit of a caricature of tax preparation software. In reality, the realms of tax
preparation and planning software overlap considerably. For example, both preparation and
planning software serve an educative function, but preparation software tends to do so in a
generic fashion while planning software can better tailor advice and education to a particular
taxpayer's situation. See infra Part IV.
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that an earned income tax credit (EITC) recipient can take home more than a dollar
from an increased dollar in wages," that education credits may be available for a
child nearing college age, or that charitable contributions will have no tax impact if
the standard deduction will exceed a taxpayer's total itemized deductions.
The general idea here is that what is important is that taxpayers understand the
impact that their life decisions will have on their tax burden, not that they understand
the mechanics of, for example, the earned income credit phase-out. Throughout this
Article, I refer to the ability to make connections between life decisions and tax as
functional transparency.
Does tax planning software serve this function today?1 2 Yes and no. Planning
software currently marketed to individual taxpayers is too simplistic to create
functional transparency. These products appear to serve as little more than marketing
devices for the tax preparation software companies that provide them. However, the
planning software marketed to professional preparers is generally much more
sophisticated. The best products facilitate detailed "what if' scenario analysis and
generate recommendations tailored to individual taxpayer situations. Combined with
the knowledge and foresight of professional preparers, these products could create
functional transparency. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the limited empirical
evidence suggests that the taxpayer clients of professional preparers may be less
knowledgeable about taxes than other taxpayers. 13
For this and a number of other reasons, I am somewhat skeptical about the
prospects for commercially available tax planning software. If enough high-income
taxpayers see value in piercing through the black box, one would expect the
promulgation of commercial planning software aimed at individual taxpayers and
that the use of planning software would expand more generally. But will the private
goals and incentives driving these developments match public goals? Will
commercially available products optimally highlight tax incentives? Will these
products be available at a price affordable to low-income taxpayers? And, of course,
even if commercially available tax planning software works perfectly, increasing
functional transparency undermines the potential positive impact that opacity has on
reducing the excess burden of the income tax.
Indeed, there may be a case for government intervention in the tax planning
software market, perhaps even for government provision or subsidization of such
software.14 Software could be designed to further the government's objectives in
addition to furthering taxpayer objectives by, for example, highlighting explicit tax
incentives incorporated in the Code. Ideally, this software would be targeted at

11. The EITC, which is an important example used throughout this Article, has become
the federal government's largest anti-poverty program, lifting about 5.6 million people,
including about 3 million children, out of poverty in 2018. Policy Basics: The EarnedIncome
Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/

research/federal-tax/policy-basics-the-earned-income-tax-credit
B9BS].

[https://perma.cc/Z2P3-

12. See infra Part IV.

13. The proffered explanation is that some taxpayers who enlist professional preparers
delegate tax compliance to these professionals and as a result have little grasp of the intricacies
of taxation. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
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taxpayers at the lower end of the income spectrum in order to level the tax planning
playing field between low- and high-income taxpayers, address the particular
complexities associated with low-income tax situations, and avoid undermining the
efficiency benefits of opacity at the high-end of the income spectrum.15
Suppose, for example, that the federal government were to adopt a pre-populated
tax return scheme for low-income taxpayers along the lines of California's Ready
Return experiment, which provided 50,000 low-income California taxpayers with
pre-prepared state income tax returns based on third party reported income and other
data during the mid-2000s. 16 While pre-populated returns would massively reduce
compliance burdens, they would likely heighten the black box nature of the tax
system for participants. Taxpayers taking advantage of pre-populated return filing
could be offered simplified tax planning software-perhaps smartphone based-to
help offset the increased black box effect, or such software could be provided to lowincome taxpayers generally if these taxpayers were priced out of the commercial tax
planning software market. Targeting government-provided planning software at
lower-income taxpayers would have the added bonus of not facilitating social
welfare reducing planning by high-income taxpayers.
To be sure, even government provision or subsidization of tax planning software
would not necessarily resolve all of the issues arising from the increasing complexity
and opacity of the Code. One might still question whether the mere availability of
such software sufficiently addresses the political accountability, fiscal citizenship,
and even personal planning concerns arising from opacity, or whether it would be a
sufficient response to these concerns that taxpayers could readily associate their life
decisions with their tax burdens, even if they did not choose or pay to do so.17
In my view, technology-driven responses to the increasing complexity and
opacity of the Code are probably inevitable. The important questions are who gets to
shape these responses-commercial concerns or the government-and what does the
answer to that question mean for equality, fairness, democracy, and efficiency?
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Parts I and II provide
background on the growth in tax complexity and opacity over time and explore how
complexity and opacity impact taxpayer behavior, generating benefits as well as
costs. Parts III and IV turn to the potential for tax planning software to restore
functional transparency to a tax code burdened by complexity and opacity, and the
current state of planning software technology. Part V makes the case for government
provision or subsidization of planning software focused on low-income taxpayers as
best balancing the benefits and costs of restoring functional transparency. Part VI

15. I believe that the arguments for providing IRS tax planning software to low-income
taxpayers and not to high-income taxpayers are persuasive, but the merits of providing such
software to middle-income taxpayers are somewhat less clear. I will generally use the term
"lower-income" taxpayers in this Article to exclude high-income taxpayers while leaving the
line-drawing question for another day.
16. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 37-40, a taxing authority may "prepopulate" tax returns using data reported by third parties, such as wages, and distribute these
returns to taxpayers who may sign and file the return or provide their own return instead.
17. These questions are asked in somewhat greater detail but are only provisionally
answered infra Part VI.
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briefly discusses broader societal implications of a technological response to tax
complexity and opacity, and Part VII concludes.
I. THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY AND OPACITY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
There is widespread agreement that the Federal Income Tax Code has become
increasingly complex over time and increasingly opaque to individual taxpayers.18
This Part will define the terms "complexity" and "opacity" as I intend to use them in
this Article and discuss their sources and growth. 19
Complexity, it has been remarked, is complex. 20 Tax complexity has been broken
down into numerous subcategories. 21 This Article is chiefly concerned with two
types of complexity-computational complexity and planning complexity. Jacob
Goldin defines computational complexity as the difficulty of determining one's
eligibility for a tax benefit and the amount of that benefit and distinguishes
computational complexity from informational complexity-the difficulty of
acquiring the information needed to determine a tax benefit. 22 Both of these types of
complexity fall within a larger category known as compliance complexity, which
may be distinguished from tax planning complexity-the cost or difficulty of
arranging one's affairs in response to tax rules. 2 3
The alternative minimum tax (AMT) has long been seen as the paradigm of
computational complexity. Although the reach of this provision was significantly
curtailed by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act ("Jobs Act"), taxpayers potentially
subject to the AMT must essentially calculate their taxes twice-once using the
regular set of inclusions, exclusions, deductions, and tax rates and the second time
using modified AMT inclusions, exclusions, deductions, and rates. Close behind the
AMT as the poster children for computational complexity are the myriad phase-outs
of various deductions, credits, and exemptions in the Code.
All of this computational complexity increases the opacity of the tax code for
individual filers and makes it more difficult to include tax consequences in one's
planning. Taxpayers may be aware of the earned income tax credit (EITC) but not be

18. Whether the Code is too complex for the job is debatable. See J.B. Ruhl & Daniel
Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV.
191, 195 (2015). Ruhl and Katz also distinguish between a legal system being complicated,
which the Code clearly is, and being complex in the sense of interdependence between its
elements. As will be apparent, this Article uses complexity in its more general sense.
19. This Article focuses on the individual federal income tax. While the corporate income
tax may also suffer from increasing complexity, I assume that corporations generally have the
resources and incentives to deal with the complexity and do not experience the same
pathologies as individual taxpayers.
20. See, e.g., Binh Tran-Nam, Tax Reform and Tax Simplicity: A New and 'Simpler' Tax
System, 23 UNIV. NEW S. WALES L.J. 241, 242 (2000) (observing that "tax simplicity (and

hence its mirror image, tax complexity) is itself a complicated notion").
21. See, e.g., Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-FriendlyTaxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509,

1514-15 (2017) (surveying the literature and describing rule-based complexity, computational
complexity, structural complexity, and compliance complexity).
22. Jacob Goldin, Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-up: Lessons from the EarnedIncome
Tax Credit, 72 TAx L. REV. 59, 74, 81 (2018).

23. Id. at 73-74, n.77.
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aware of whether, given their income, they are eligible for the maximum credit, some
fraction of the maximum, or no credit at all.24 Taxpayers on the cusp of the AMT
may not know whether various potential tax deductions, for example, state and local
income taxes or real estate taxes, will reduce their ultimate tax liability. None of these
taxpayers may have an accurate conception of their marginal tax rate (MTR) and the
after-tax implications of marginal adjustments to income or various expenses.
Another closely related concept is tax salience. As Deborah Schenk describes,
salience refers to the visibility or prominence of a tax provision.25 Tax provisions
that are more economically salient have a greater effect on taxpayer behavior. 26 More
computationally complex tax provisions are likely to be less salient.27
It is, I believe, universally agreed that the Tax Code has become more
computationally complex over time. Whether measured in terms of pages devoted to
the Federal Income Tax Code and regulations or the amount of time expended in
complying with the Code, complexity seems to rise inexorably. 28 To be sure, the

24. The EITC is a refundable tax credit. The design includes a phase-in range across
which recipients receive a credit equal to a percentage of earnings up to a maximum credit
level, a plateau across which the credit-the maximum credit-does not vary with income,
and a phase-out range across which the credit declines at a fixed percentage of income. The
phase-in and phase-out percentages are a function of the number of qualifying children in the
household. See I.R.C. § 32; see also Goldin, supra note 22, at 63-66 (describing the design of
the EITC).
25. Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON
REGUL. 253, 253 (2011).

26. Id. at 263. Gamage and Shanske refer to this type of salience as market salience. David
Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political
Science, 65 TAx L. REv. 19, 20 (2011).

27. Schenk, supra note 25, at 263. Salience is related to the availability heuristic.
According to the availability heuristic as described by Tversky and Kahneman, individuals
tend to "assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCi. 1124, 1127 (1974). One factor
that affects availability is salience. Id. McCaffery suggests that complexity acts as a multiplier
on the availability bias. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv.
1861, 1926 (1994). For further discussion of the relationship between salience and the
availability bias in the tax context, see Schenk, supra note 25, at 264.
28. See Andrew Lundeen, A Lot Has Changed in the 27 Years Since the Last Major Tax
Reform, TAx FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/lot-has-changed-27-years-

last-major-tax-reform/ (stating that between 1986 and 2013 the Tax Code has increased from
less than 30,000 pages to over 70,000 pages); Annette Nellen & Jeffrey A. Porter, 30 Years
After the Tax Reform Act: Still Aiming for a Better Tax System, J. ACCT. (Oct. 1, 2016),

https://www.joumalofaccountancy.com/issues/2016/oct/tax-reform-act.html
[https://perma.cc/WKB7-LRH8] (referencing a press release from Sen. Max Baucus, then
chair of the Senate Finance Committee, stating between 1986 and 2012, "Congress has made
15,000 changes to the tax code"); Scott Greenberg, Federal Tax Laws and Regulations are
Now Over 10 Million Words Long, TAx FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/

federal-tax-laws-and-regulations-are-now-over-10-million-words-long
[https://perma.cc/
PP8V-6UYJ] (stating that "as of 2015, federal tax laws and regulations have grown to over 10
million words in length" and describing how the length has grown steadily over the past 60
years from 1.4 million in 1955); id. ("Americans spend 6.1 billion hours and $233.8 billion
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recently enacted Jobs Act included some simplifying changes. By reducing the
personal exemption amount to zero through 2025, the Jobs Act effectively suspended
the phase-out of personal exemptions. 29 The Jobs Act also suspended through 2025
the phase-down of itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers 30 and, by doubling
the standard deduction, dramatically reduced the number of taxpayers who will
itemize. Finally, the Jobs Act raised the AMT exemption levels and exemption
phase-out thresholds, drastically reducing the number of taxpayers potentially
subject to the AMT.31 Of course, only time will tell whether these reforms will stick.
Moreover, the Jobs Act ushered in an incredibly complex set of provisions-the
§199A qualified business income deduction-which is now available to a large
number of individual taxpayers.
There are undoubtedly many reasons for the complexity of the Code. 32 Congress's
propensity for locating social programs and incentives in the Tax Code, generally
referred to as tax expenditures, certainly adds complexity. Critics, beginning with
Stanley Surrey, have lamented this use of the Code for a variety of reasons, including
the resulting increase in complexity. 33 On this score, I share the view of Jacob Nussim
and David Weisbach-that tax expenditures are not inherently objectionable, and
that the tax system may be the most appropriate means of administering certain social
programs, such as the EITC, for example. 3 4 But whatever one's take on that question,
undoubtedly tax expenditures add complexity. 35

complying with the tax code.").
29. I.R.C. § 151(d)(5).
30. I.R.C. § 68(f).
31. Scott Eastman, The Alternative Minimum Tax Still Burdens Taxpayers with
Compliance Costs, 647 TAx FOUND. 8 (Apr. 2019), https://files.taxfoundation.org/

2019040410203 9/The-Alternative-Minimum-Tax-Still-Burdens-Taxpayers-withCompliance-Costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/78X7-PVVU] (reporting that these AMT reforms are
expected to reduce the number of taxpayers paying the AMT from five million to 200,000).
32. In addition to Congress's propensity to situate social welfare programs in the Tax
Code, Gale and Holtzblatt ascribe complexity to an unavoidable conflict between simplicity
and fairness, to politics, and to the inherent complexity of the income tax base. WILLIAM G.
GALE & JANET HOLTZBLATT, The Role of Administrative Factors in Tax Reform: Simplicity,
Compliance and Enforcement, in UNITED STATES TAX REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 179,
181-83 (George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski eds., 2002).
33. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 731 (1970)

(arguing that "the tax system is complex enough as it is, and to have a large number of tax
incentives side by side with the provisions making up the structure of the tax itself can only
cause confusion and a blurring of concepts and objectives"). Surrey described a number of
other disadvantages of tax expenditures including the "upside down" effect of subsidies
framed as tax deductions as these are worth more to high-income individuals in high tax
brackets than they are to low-income individuals who are in low brackets or who do not pay
tax at all. Id. at 720-24.
34. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,

113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004).
35. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 33641, TAx EXPENDITURES:
TRENDS AND CRITIQUES 13 (2006). While many tax expenditure provisions arguably are

appropriately situated in the Code, most tax expenditures include phase-out provisions that
increase complexity. These phase-outs are justified as limiting benefits to low-income
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Larry Zelenak has argued that there may be a link between technology and
computational complexity. 36 His quite plausible idea, as noted in the introduction, is
that technology has reduced the cost to taxpayers of complying with complex tax
provisions, which has made such provisions more palatable, and made it easier for
Congress to enact complex provisions.
However, while TurboTax and other tax preparation software products have
reduced the cost of complying with complex provisions-have reduced
computational complexity-they have done little to address opacity and planning
complexity. Taxpayers preparing their taxes using TurboTax may simply input data
on income and expenses following software prompts and easily arrive at a net tax
amount owed or to be refunded, but this sort of blind use of tax preparation software
renders the process a black box. A taxpayer using these tools would not necessarily
know, for example, whether her various expenses actually reduced her taxes or by
how much. To be sure, modern tax preparation software marketed to individuals
typically includes tax tips that serve an educative function, but as discussed below,
these are unlikely to produce much transparency. Tax preparation software also
reduces the compliance cost of taxpayers who enlist professional preparers, but
again, this use of software is unlikely to illuminate the black box.
Another technological innovation-pre-populated return generation-shares
these properties, reducing compliance costs but increasing or failing to reduce
opacity in the face of complex tax provisions. California experimented with prepopulated return filing, known as Ready Return, in 2004 and 2005.37 Taking
advantage of the prevalence of third-party reporting of wage and salary income,
California sent pre-populated state income tax returns to 50,000 taxpayers with the
simplest tax situations based on prior years' returns.38 The recipients were free to
sign and file the pre-populated return or submit their own return instead. The program
was successful by most metrics with participation exceeding projections and
satisfaction ratings in the high nineties. 39 Today, elements of Ready Return are
incorporated in California's CalFile electronic tax filing system, but Ready Return
has not achieved its promise, due in large part to opposition from the providers of tax
preparation software."

taxpayers, but as Daniel Shaviro has argued, this justification is flawed in the sense that a
better, more efficient policy would be to eschew phase-outs and adjust statutory marginal tax
rates accordingly. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the EarnedIncome Tax Credit
and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 408-09 (1997); see also Lawrence
Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAx L. 91, 113-16

(2010). Of course, if adjusting statutory rates is politically impossible, tax expenditures with
phase-outs may be better than no tax expenditures at all. See Shaviro, supra, at 409-10;
Zelenak, supra, at 114-15.
36. Zelenak, supra note 35.
37. Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, LXI(4) NAT'L
TAX J. 773, 783 (2008).
38. Id.

39. Id. at 784.
40. See Joseph Bankman, Clifford Nass & Joel Slemrod, Using the "Smart Return" to
Reduce Evasion and Simplify Filing, 69 TAx L. REV. 459, 481 (2016) (noting that elements of

Ready Return were consolidated into CalFile in 2014); Joseph Bankman, Simplified Filing
Would be a Boon for All Taxpayers, Not Just those who File the Simplest Returns, and Would
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Despite the current setback, given increasing third-party reporting and advances
in technology, one can imagine a future in which pre-populated returns are an option
for a large number of taxpayers. Some of these taxpayers will put in the time and
effort to understand their tax situation and determine whether the pre-populated
return is correct. But others are likely to simply sign and file the pre-populated return.
For these taxpayers, compliance costs will be vanishingly small, but the tax system

will likely be a complete black box yielding high planning complexity.
Looking further ahead, Joshua Blank and Leigh Osofsky envision a day in which
artificial intelligence (AI) has developed to such a degree that taxes may be
calculated automatically even for individuals with complex tax situations, obviously
reducing compliance costs, but with the result that "the public stops understanding
what the law is." 41 As with pre-populated return filing, in Blank and Osofsky's world
of return-free compliance, computational complexity is likely high but the costs of
managing that complexity are minimal. Planning complexity, however, would seem
to continue to be significant.
II. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INCREASED COMPLEXITY AND OPACITY

While some will simply bleat "complexity bad, simplicity good," in reality,
complexity is more complex than that. There are benefits as well as costs to tax
complexity, which are explored in this Part. The primary benefit has to do with
improving the efficiency of the income tax. Thus, this Part begins with a brief
introduction to efficiency analysis of income tax provisions and an exploration of
taxpayer responsiveness to taxation, before considering the benefits and costs of
complexity and opacity, per se. Understanding these costs and benefits is a
prerequisite to effective evaluation of potential technological responses to tax
complexity and opacity.
A. Efficiency of the LaborIncome Tax4 2
Taxes affect behavior. Most obviously, an individual who has $100 of income
before tax will consume or save differently depending on whether she faces a tax of

Save Substantially on Filing Costs, 34 ABA: POINT & COUNTERPOINT (Aug. 25, 2016),

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/publications/abataxtimes_home/16aug/16augpcp-bankman-maule-perspectives-on-two-proposals-for-filing-tax-simplification/
[https://perma.cc/G6ZJ-GT4W] (discussing Intuit's opposition to Ready Return and other
similar systems); Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens the California

ReadyReturn, 107 TAx NOTES 1431, 1434 (2005) (discussing the tax preparation business's
opposition to ReadyReturn).
41. Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Automated Legal Guidance, 106 CORNELL L. REv.
179, 187 (2020).
42. See generally, HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (1985); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & JAY
K. ROSENGARD, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (4th ed. 2015). For helpful and concise

discussions of efficiency analysis of taxation, see Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect:
Taxes and ConsumerProtection, 1 COLUM. J. TAxL. 218, 234-37 (2010); David A. Weisbach,
Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627, 1650-55

(1999).
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$0, $20 or $40, because taxes affect her wealth. But this "income" effect of taxation
is unavoidable if society is to fund public goods, and it is a function of the amount
of tax raised, not the method. In a revenue-neutral analysis, for example, we extract
$20 of tax and return $20 in public goods, the income effect falls away. Thus,
efficiency analysis of taxation focuses not on the income effect of taxation but on a
second effect-the "substitution" effect. 43
The substitution effect refers to the change in behavior resulting from differential
taxation. For example, our income tax taxes returns to labor (and savings) but not
our enjoyment of leisure. As a result, we work less and "consume" more leisure under
a labor income tax than we would in a no tax world. This makes sense; we are all
maximizing our utility given the tax system we face, but this distortion in
consumption patterns (not amount) reduces our aggregate utility beyond that simply
associated with the income effect of taxation. We would, taxes aside, prefer to work
a little more and recreate a little less, but the tax on wages distorts that choice.
Economists refer to the additional loss of utility resulting from the distortion in
behavior as the excess burden of taxation or deadweight loss.4 4
Consider a uniform lump sum or head tax. Such a tax produces an income effect
but no substitution effect because the tax is essentially unavoidable.4 5 It can be
avoided only by dying or expatriating. If we take these two options off the table, a
lump-sum tax does not distort taxpayer behavior beyond the change arising from the
income effect. Thus, a lump-sum tax is an efficient tax that creates no excess burden.
Of course, a lump-sum tax is also patently unjust as it totally ignores an individual's
ability to pay taxes. Real world taxes that are based on measures of income,
consumption, or wealth, are fairer in that regard, but because they are by definition
not uniform, they inevitably create substitution effects and excess burden. In this
decidedly second-best world, the efficiency goal is to minimize the distortion and
excess burden for a given amount of revenue raised.4 6
Under an income tax, the primary distortion that we are concerned about is along
the labor/leisure front and the degree of distortion or excess burden in theory is a
function of the MTR-the tax on the next or last dollar earned by the taxpayerbecause it is the MTR that determines the relative after-tax value of labor and leisure
and the distortions in behavior that arise from taxing the one but not the other.4 7
Importantly, however, the relationship between the MTR and excess burden is not
linear; excess burden increases with the square of the tax rate. 48

43. Weisbach, supra note 42, at 1653-54; Nussim, supra note 42, at 235.
44. Weisbach, supra note 42, at 1651 ("The deadweight loss of the tax is the loss in value
to consumers in excess of the revenue raised by the government.").
45. Nussim, supra note 42, at 236.

46. Nussim, supra note 42, at 237; Weisbach, supra note 42, at 1653. Obviously, there
are other considerations in selecting or designing tax schemes including compliance costs
incurred by taxpayers and enforcement costs incurred by taxing authorities. These add to the
total deadweight loss of taxation.
47. Note again that I use the term "effective marginal tax rate," abbreviated as MTR, in
this Article to refer to a taxpayer's actual marginal rate taking into account phase-in and phaseout provisions and similar adjustments and to distinguish this rate from statutory marginal
rates or tax brackets.
48. See Weisbach, supra note 42, at 1651; Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the
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B. Do Taxpayers UnderstandandRespond to Taxation?
The forgoing is theoretically sound. But does it reflect reality? Do taxpayers
understand and respond to the economic incentives created by taxation? Are
distortions real? Because if taxpayer behavior is not distorted in actuality, taxes don't
create inefficiencies. But the evidence suggests that while taxpayers don't respond
to taxes as perfectly informed, rational economic actors, taxes do distort behavior.
The primary distortion we would expect from a labor income tax is to labor
supply. Increasing taxes on labor should result in less work and more leisure.
Economists capture the effect of taxes on labor supply by measuring labor supply
elasticity-the effect of taxes on employment rates and hours worked. 49 However,
historically, studies have found fairly low labor supply elasticities along the intensive
margin (hours worked), suggesting that hours worked are not terribly sensitive to tax
rates. 50 To be sure, there are several possible explanations for this finding that do not
run counter to standard economic theory. Perhaps incentives to keep one's job or to
be promoted have more to do with labor supply than tax rates. Raj Chetty has
suggested that various frictions could explain low labor supply elasticities.5 1 Or
perhaps taxes affect labor supply but over a longer time horizon than can be captured
2
in empirical studies.
In an important paper, however, Martin Feldstein argued that focusing on labor
supply alone is too narrow a perspective and that all responses to taxes should be
considered in evaluating the deadweight loss of taxation.5 3 Feldstein found, and later
work confirms, that elasticities of taxable income to tax are significantly larger than
labor supply elasticities. 54 For example, if taxpayers increase charitable contributions
or contributions to retirement plans as tax rates increase, these distortions would be
reflected in measures of taxable income, but not in labor supply. Emmanuel Saez,

DeadweightLoss of the Income Tax, 81 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 674, 678, n.15 (1999). It is

difficult to explain exactly why deadweight loss is a function of the square of the tax rate and
the concept is generally demonstrated graphically using demand curves. Deadweight loss is
the area of a right triangle under a downward sloping demand curve with height equal to the
amount of tax imposed and base equal to the reduction in quantity demanded given the tax. If
the tax is raised by an increment t, there is an increase in both the height and base of the
deadweight loss triangle. Since the area of a right triangle is equal to (b x h)/2, and both b and
h increase with t, deadweight loss increases with t 2. See Weisbach, supra note 42, for an
example of the graphical depiction of deadweight loss.
49. Raj Chetty, Bounds on Elasticitieswith Optimization Frictions:A Synthesis of Micro
and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply, 80 ECONOMETRICA 969, 971-72 (2012). The effect of

taxes on employment rates is known as the extensive margin elasticity and the effect on hours
worked by those employed is known as the intensive margin elasticity. Id.
50. See Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticityof Taxable Income
with Respect to MarginalTax Rates: A CriticalReview, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 3, 3-4 (2012) ("[T]he
profession has settled on a value for this elasticity close to zero for prime-age males, although

for married women the responsiveness of labor force participation appears to be significant.").
51.

Chetty, supra note 49.

87-89 (2008).
53. Feldstein, supra note 48.
54. Feldstein, supra note 48; Saez et al., supranote 50, at 42 (noting that the best available
estimates of the elasticity of taxable income range from 0.12 to 0.40).
52.
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Joel Slemrod, and Seth Giertz caution that some taxable income elasticity may
simply reflect time shifting (as in the retirement funding example) or entity shifting
(from individual to corporate form, for example), which represent tax-induced
distortions but not of the type that create significant deadweight losses.55
In addition, there is survey and experimental evidence that sheds some light on
taxpayer understanding of (but not responsiveness to) tax rate schedules. The bottom
line is that most taxpayers lack a solid grasp on their MTRs and, while some studies
find overestimation, most studies find underestimation, particularly for high-income
taxpayers. In survey evidence reported in 1988, Fujii and Hawley found that of the
65% of subjects who reported an estimated MTR, on average these respondents
underestimated their MTRs by about 3 percentage points, 56 a result that the authors
characterized as evidence that taxpayers know their MTRs (glass half full),57 and
which Emmanuel Saez characterized as evidence that taxpayers don't know their
MTRs or report them with substantial error (glass half empty). 58 In 1995, Rupert and
Fischer provided survey evidence suggesting both over and underestimation of

55. Saez et al., supra note 50, at 10. Other research has explored whether taxpayers
respond to more discrete tax incentives created by "kinks" in the income tax schedule. The
federal income tax system includes numerous kinks-points at which the MTR changes
abruptly-such as the point at which marginal income goes from being taxed at a zero rate to
being taxed at a 10% rate, or the point at which an EITC eligible worker's income subsidy is
capped. In theory, if taxpayers are both aware of the details of the tax schedule and respond to
these details by, for example, adjusting their labor supply, these kinks in the tax schedule
should result in taxpayers reporting income that is bunched at the kinks. See Raj Chetty, John
N. Friedman, Tore Olsen & Luigi Pistaferri, Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, andMicro vs.
Macro Labor Supply Elasticities:Evidence from Danish Tax Records, 126 Q.J. ECON. 749,

749-56 & n.12 (2011) (providing the following quote in explaining the rationale for the
expectation of bunching at a large MTR kink point in the Danish tax system: "By the end of
November, some of my colleagues stop working. It does not pay anymore because they have
reached the high tax bracket."). In a 2010 paper, however, Emmanuel Saez finds very little
evidence of bunching at kinks in the U.S. federal income tax. See Emmanuel Saez, Do
Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 180 (2010). He finds some
bunching at the first kink in the EITC schedule, the income level at which the EITC reaches
its maximum level, and some bunching at the first income tax bracket kink (the point at which
the 10% rate kicks in) but little evidence of bunching otherwise. Id. at 181. Moreover, he
speculates that the bunching at the first EITC kink may reflect misreporting of income (i.e.,
cheating) rather than an actual impact on labor supply. Id. at 193 (noting that most of the
bunching at the first EITC kink is associated with self-employed workers whose income is not
verified by third party reporting). On the other hand, Raj Chetty and colleagues do find
substantial bunching at a very significant kink in the Danish income tax schedule. Chetty et
al., supra, at 751. Saez speculates that the differences in outcomes of the two studies may have
to do with the relative simplicity of the Danish tax system and the greater economic
significance of the Danish tax kink. Saez, supra, at 182 n.6 (noting that the threshold for the
top Danish income tax bracket is uniform for all individuals and that Danish taxes are based
on individual (not family) income).
56. Edwin T. Fujii & Clifford B. Hawley, On the Accuracy of Tax Perceptions, 70 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 344, 346 (1988).
57. See id. at 346-47.
58. Saez, supra note 55, at 182.
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MTRs based on a population of mostly low- and middle-income taxpayers. 59 More
recently, in 2015, Gideon tested taxpayer perception of their statutory rates and found
that low-income taxpayers tended to overestimate their statutory rates, while highincome taxpayers tended to underestimate. 60 However, MTRs for both groups of
taxpayers are likely to be greater than statutory rates given numerous deduction and
credit phase-outs. 61
Several studies find that taxpayers frequently employ average rates in decision
making instead of marginal rates. Because average rates are generally lower than
MTRs in a progressive system, this error is essentially equivalent to underestimation
of MTRs. 62 In 1995, de Bartolome reported experimental evidence that subjects
presented with a tax table that highlighted average rates, but not MTRs, tended to
use average rates in decision making. 63 Subjects presented with a tax schedule that
highlighted MTRs did not make the same error. 64 Of course, today only about 10%
of taxpayers file returns without assistance and use the tables or worksheets provided
by the IRS.6 5 In a 2005 working paper, Feldman and Katuscak also found evidence,
based on survey data, that taxpayers tend to use average rates in place of MTRs, a
result that the authors attributed to the complexity of the Code. 66
In an intriguing experiment reported in 2003, Rupert, Single, and Wright found
that subjects failed to adjust their estimates of their MTRs for floors and phase-outs
of deductions and credits and thus tended to underestimate their MTRs. 67 Subjects
presented with less complex adjustments to statutory rates made smaller errors than
those presented with more complex adjustments. 68
To be sure, several of these studies are quite old. On the other hand, the Code is
more complex and opaque today, which does not bode well for the level of current
taxpayer understanding and use of MTRs. As further discussed below, the factors

59. Timothy J. Rupert & Carol M. Fischer, An Empirical Investigation of Taxpayer
Awareness ofMarginalTax Rates, 17 J. AM. TAx Ass'N 36 (1995).
60. Michael Gideon, Do Individuals Perceive Income Tax Rates Correctly, 45 PUB. FIN.

REV. 97, 99 (2017).
61. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
62. Offsetting this effect to some degree is survey evidence suggesting that taxpayers
systematically overestimate average rates. Charles L. Ballard & Sanjay Gupta, Perceptions
and Realities ofAverage Tax Rates in the FederalIncome Tax: Evidence from Michigan, 71
NAT'L TAX J. 263 (2018).
63. Charles A.M. de Bartolome, Which Tax Rate Do People Use: Average or Marginal?,

56 J. PUB. ECON, 79, 79-80 (1995).
64. Id.
65. Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers:Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 131 (2014) (testimony of John A. Koskinen,

Comm'r of Internal Revenue Service), https://www.finance.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/90922.pdf [https://perma.cc/42CF-Q25R] [hereinafterProtectingTaxpayers].
66. Naomi E. Feldman & Peter Katuscak, Should the Average Tax Be Marginalized?89 (Working Paper, 2005).
67. Timothy J. Rupert, Louise E. Single & Arnold M. Wright, The Impact of Floors and
Phase-Outs on Taxpayers' Decisions and Understanding of Marginal Tax Rates, 25 J. AM.
TAx Ass'N 72, 73 (2003).

68. Id. at 79.
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that make the Code computationally complex tend to reduce MTRs below statutory
rates, generally resulting in underestimation of MTRs.
In sum, it is clear that taxpayers respond to taxes. Elasticities of taxable income
to tax rates are significant and deadweight loss from differential taxation is real. The
accuracy of taxpayer perception of MTRs and the speed and degree of responsiveness
to changes in MTRs remain somewhat open questions.
C. Positive Aspects of the Complexity and Opacity of the FederalIncome Tax
With that brief primer on efficiency of taxation and equally brief review of
evidence regarding taxpayer understanding of and responsiveness to taxes, we now
consider how the complexity of the federal income tax could actually increase social
welfare.
1. Increased Accuracy
First, a more complex tax system can support a more accurate tax system that
makes finer gradations between taxpayers based on relevant metrics, such as ability
to pay. As Louis Kaplow describes, a more accurate tax system improves the
distribution of the tax burden making it "more likely that high-income individuals
pay high taxes and low-income individuals pay low taxes."69 Compare, for example,
a lump sum head tax to even a rudimentary wage tax. The latter is more complex and
while still far from perfect, obviously better recognizes ability to pay.
But Kaplow focuses on another benefit of improving accuracy, which is that a
more accurate tax is more efficient.70 Because excess burden is a function of the
square of the tax rate, 7 1 errors in determining income that result in a higher tax rate
cause greater increases in distortion and excess burden than is avoided by errors that
result in a lower rate. 72 Random errors, in other words, do not even out. As a result,
increasing accuracy reduces aggregate excess burden. 73 This result holds, Kaplow
notes, as long as taxpayers are aware of mismeasurement and act accordingly. 74
The accuracy theme has been repeated in more recent commentary that focuses
on the potential for Al to disrupt tax design and assessment. The idea here is that AIbased tools will eventually be able to quickly and inexpensively answer all tax
questions, incorporating all relevant tax materials-the Code, regulations, other
written guidance, and caselaw. 75 Commentators suggest that such technology could

69. Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity and the Income Tax 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.

Rsch., Working Paper No. 4631, 1994).
70. See id. at 3.

71. See Feldstein, supra note 48.
72. Kaplow, supra note 69, at 2.

73. Suppose, for example, that the accurate tax for each of two taxpayers is 10.
Deadweight loss would be a function of 2 x 102 or 200. Suppose instead that one taxpayer is
taxed at 8 and the other at 12. The total deadweight loss in this scenario is a function of 82
plus 122, which is 208.
74. Kaplow, supra note 69, at 2.
75. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death ofRules and Standards, 92 IND.
L.J. 1401, 1419 (2017); Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66
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be used to generate optimal tax rules that yield greater revenue with minimal
distortions. 76 While the underlying tax rules would be extremely complex and
perhaps even individualized, the directives to taxpayers, for example, pay $X, would
be simple. 7
2. Reduced Deadweight Loss
Of course, this AI-based tax system would be opaque, which leads to
consideration of the potential benefits of complex and opaque tax provisions. In
short, such provisions can reduce the excess burden of the income tax if they lead
taxpayers to either ignore taxes in their decision making or to consider taxes in their
decision making but to underestimate their MTRs.
One approach to a tax system that is a complete black box is to pay one's taxes
when due but to ignore taxes in decision making. While ignoring taxes in decision
making would have obvious drawbacks, which are considered in the following
sections, doing so would reduce or eliminate the inefficient distortions that arise
when individuals respond to taxes. 78
There is some evidence that individuals respond less to hidden or low-salience
taxes. For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft conducted an experiment in which
certain products in stores were labelled with sales tax inclusive prices while labels
on other products did not include sales taxes. 79 Although consumers had an accurate
understanding of sales taxes in the abstract, 80 they reduced purchases of sales tax
inclusive labelled goods relative to goods that lacked such labels. 81 The authors
attributed this result not to information, but to salience and bounded rationality,8 2 an
effect that Brian Galle refers to as "cognitive loafing." 83 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft
also found in a separate study reported in the same paper that increases in beer excise
taxes, which are included in posted prices, reduced demand for beer more than
increases in beer sales taxes, which were not posted at the shelf but only added at
checkout. 84 Similarly, Amy Finkelstein found that the introduction of automated
highway toll collection such as EZ Pass led to higher tolls, presumably because the
elimination of toll collection at toll booths reduced drivers' awareness of tolls or the
salience of these tolls. 85

U. TORONTO L.J. 443, 443 (2016).

76. See Casey & Niblett, supra note 75, at 1419; Alarie, supra note 75, at 443.
77. See Casey & Niblett, supra note 75, at 1419; Alarie, supra note 75, at 443.
78. See Austan Goolsbee, The TurboTax Revolution: Can Technology Solve Tax
Complexity, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 124, 138 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod

eds., 2004).
79. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REv. 1145 (2009).

80. The authors surveyed shoppers about sales tax rates and found that the median subject
correctly answered seven of eight questions about the taxable status of goods. Id. at 1165.
81. Id. at 1146.
82. Id. at 1147.
83. Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U.L. REv. 59, 75 (2009).
84. Chetty et al., supra note 79, at 1146.
85. Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969, 1008-09

&
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Commentators generally agree that low-salience taxes can be used to improve the
efficiency of taxation by reducing distortions and deadweight loss. 86 It seems
unlikely, of course, that individuals would totally ignore the federal income tax. But
this isn't what's required for salience to matter. Individuals may be fully aware of
the income tax, but if the complexity and opacity of the Code reduce the salience of
the tax at the time that these individuals make life decisions, that reduction in salience
could lead to smaller distortions and deadweight loss. 87
Relatedly, Deborah Schenk argues that while the federal income tax is salient, in
the sense of being prominent, distortions in behavior and deadweight loss may be
limited, and social welfare enhanced, if as a result of complexity and opacity
individuals underestimate their MTRs. 8
The basic idea here, as explained by de Bartolome and by Feldman and Katuscak,
is that if a sizable number of taxpayers in a particular group underestimate their
MTRs, they will supply more labor than they otherwise would, reducing distortions
and excess burden and generating greater tax revenue. 89 Any particular taxpayer
would be better off if she accurately understood her MTR and reduced her labor
supply accordingly. However, if most or all taxpayers in this group accurately
understand their MTRs and reduce their labor supply, this will result in significantly
reduced tax revenue collected from this group. If the revenue requirement is fixed,
tax rates will have to be increased to generate the same revenue and all taxpayers in
this cohort will be worse off than they were when all mistakenly underestimated their

MTRs. 90

As discussed above, the limited survey evidence suggests that many taxpayers do
not have an accurate understanding of their MTRs and tend to underestimate, if
anything. 91 But this evidence is somewhat dated and limited, so let us return to
theory.
To the extent that taxpayers make an effort to understand their tax situation, would
complexity tend to lead taxpayers to under or overestimate their MTRs? One cannot

(2009).

86. Galle, supra note 83, at 112; Gamage & Shanske, supra note 26, at 60; Schenk, supra
note 25, at 255.
87. This situation would mirror Chetty et al.'s findings regarding sales tax salience.
Shoppers were well aware of sales tax rules and rates but nonetheless responded differently
when their attention was called to them in the shopping aisle. Chetty et al., supra note 79, at
1146.
88. Schenk, supra note 25, at 273, 283. But Schenk adds that "the conclusion that a lowsalience income tax provision is efficiency-enhancing is not sufficiently robust to be the sole
support for intentionally exploiting the salience bias." Id at 284.
89. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
90. De Bartolome, supra note 63, at 91-94; Feldman & Katuscak, supra note 66, at 1012. These authors focus on the case in which taxpayers misperceive average rates as marginal
rates, a special case of underestimation of marginal rates. Both sets of authors specifically
claim that underestimation is welfare enhancing. Liebman and Zeckhauser conduct a similar
analysis of the average/marginal rate confusion and generate similar results for the impact on
excess burden without addressing social welfare implications directly. Jeffrey B. Liebman
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling 25-26 (Harvard Univ. & NBER, Working Paper, 2004).
I should note that of these three papers, only de Bartolome's article is published.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
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be sure without more evidence, but two factors suggest that increasing complexity
would be associated with underestimation and thus with reduced distortion and
deadweight loss, at least for middle- to high-income taxpayers. The first factor is the
proliferation of deduction and credit phase-outs and floors on various deductions
under the regular income tax.
In recent years, 2 numerous regular tax deductions and credits have been phased
out (or down) with income, including the EITC, 93 personal exemptions,94 itemized
deductions, 95 the dependent care credit,96 the child tax credit,97 the adoption credit,98
the making work pay credit, 99 and various education0 0 and retirement 01 deductions
and credits. 102 Phasing out a deduction or credit increases a taxpayer's MTR above
the statutory rate otherwise applicable. Suppose, for example, that certain taxpayers
are entitled to a $10,000 credit for some expenditure if their adjusted gross income
(AGI) does not exceed $100,000, but that the credit phases down at a rate of 20 cents
for each dollar of AGI in excess of $100,000, being reduced to zero for taxpayers
with AGI of $150,000. Also suppose that the marginal statutory rate applicable to all
of these taxpayers is 25%. 103 Within the phase-out range, for each additional dollar
of income, taxpayers will lose 20 cents of their credit in addition to facing a tax of
25 cents. Thus, the MTR in the phase-out range will be 45% 104 Taxpayers in this
situation who focus on the statutory rate (the posted price, if you will), will

92. As Zelenak notes, although "[p]hase-outs became a significant feature of the income
tax in the 1980s, ... the most dramatic growth in phase-outs occurred" in the 1990s. Zelenak,
supra note 35, at 106.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§ 32.

§ 151(d) (suspended until 2025).
§ 68 (suspended until 2025).
§ 21.
§ 24.
§ 23.
99. In place in 2009 and 2010. See CONGR. RES. SERV., R40969 WITHHOLDING OF INCOME
TAXES
AND
THE
MAKING
WORK
PAY
TAX
CREDIT
(Jan. 30,
2013),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20130130_R40969_0e50564ebded07e5b2 laf3f3 8e809
28bdfc21714.pdf [https://perma.cc/887P-FMCG].
100. These include the American Opportunity and Lifetime Learning Credits, I.R.C § 25A,
the deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses, I.R.C. § 222, the deduction for interest
on education loans, I.R.C. § 221, and the deduction for contributions to Coverdell Education
Savings Accounts, I.R.C. § 530.
101. These include the so-called "saver's credit," I.R.C. § 25B, and deductible
contributions to traditional and Roth IRAs, I.R.C. §§ 219, 408A.
102. For a snapshot of current phase-out provisions of the IRC, see Briefing Book: Key
Elements ofthe U.S. Tax System: How Do Phaseoutsof Tax ProvisionsAffect Taxpayers? TAX

POL'Y CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-phaseoutstax-provisions-affect-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/XZZ5-JFWU].
103. Most floors and phase-outs in the Code are based on some measure of adjusted gross
income, which is gross income less a certain set of specified deductions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §
32(a) (phasing out the EITC based on a percentage of AGI in excess of a threshold); I.R.C. §
213(a) (setting a floor on deductibility of medical expenses at 7.5% of AGI).
104. Because the phase-out here is of a credit, the credit phase-out percentage and the
statutory MTR can simply be added to calculate an effective MTR.
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underestimate their actual MTR, potentially reducing distortions in their supply of
labor relative to the distortions that would occur under a fully transparent tax scheme.
Floors placed on various deductions have a similar impact on MTRs. Medical and
dental expenses, for example, are deductible only to the extent that their aggregate
amount exceeds 7.5% of a taxpayer's AG. 10 5 Suppose a taxpayer has AGI of
$100,000 and medical expenses of $10,000. Of that amount, $2500 of medical
expenses would be deductible.106 But for each additional dollar of gross income, the
taxpayer will lose seven and a half cents of her deduction for medical expenses
because of the seven and a half cent increase in the floor. As a result, her MTR will
be 7.5% greater than the statutory rate. 107 Again, if a taxpayer focuses on her statutory
rate but is subject to a floor on deductions, she will underestimate her MTR.
Moving beyond the regular income tax, a second factor that in recent years has
tended to result in MTRs in excess of statutory rates is the alternative minimum tax.
Prior to the enactment of the Jobs Act, over five million U.S. taxpayers paid the
AMT. 108 The AMT is essentially a second tax system incorporating a broader base,
large exemptions, and nominally lower tax rates. But because the AMT exemption
amounts phase out for higher-income taxpayers, MTRs under the AMT are often
higher than non-AMT statutory rates. The Tax Policy Center reported that about 77%
of households subject to the AMT faced a higher MTR in 2015 than they would have

105. I.R.C. § 213. Other deductions subject to floors include miscellaneous itemized
deductions and casualty losses. Miscellaneous itemized deductions, including unreimbursed
business expenses of employees, are allowed only to the extent that their aggregate exceeds
2% of AGI. I.R.C. §67(a). However, the deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions is
completely suspended through 2025. I.R.C. §67(g). Deductions for net personal casualty
losses of individuals are allowed only to the extent that their aggregate exceeds 10% of AGI.
I.R.C. § 165(h)(2). Through 2025, deductions for casualty losses are generally limited to losses
from federally declared disasters. I.R.C. § 165(h)(5).
106. This is because the floor on the deduction would be 7.5% of $100,000, or $7500.
107. To keep things simple, suppose in this example that the taxpayer's statutory and
average tax rates are 25% and that medical expenses are the taxpayer's only itemized
deductions. (These simplifications do not affect the analysis.) At AGI of $100,000, taxable
income would be $97,500 ($100,000-$2500 deduction after the 7.5% of AGI floor), and tax
would be $24,375. At AGI of $100,001, taxable income would be $97,501.075 ($100,001$2499.924 deduction after the 7.5% of AGI floor), and tax would be $24,375.2688. In other
words, a $1 increase in gross income increases tax by 26.9 cents for a 26.9% MTR, 7.5%
higher than the 25% statutory rate.
108. Reed Shuldiner, Was the AMT Effectively Repealed?, 159 TAx NOTES 495, 498
(2018). The Jobs Act reduced the reach of the AMT to about 200,000 taxpayers in 2018, but
the changes are due to expire at the end of 2025. Barring further legislative action, the old
AMT rules will be restored in 2026 and the provision is estimated to affect 6.7 million
taxpayers in 2026. Briefing Book: Key Elements of the US. Tax System: What is the AMT?
TAx POL'Y CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-amt

[https://perma.cc/5B5P-X25K].
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faced under the regular income tax. 109 As Burman, Gale, and Rohaly note, the idea
that the AMT broadens the base and reduces rates is, or was, a myth."
As a result of these provisions, middle- and upper-income taxpayers whose MTRs
differ from their statutory rates more often face an MTR that exceeds their statutory
rate, rather than the reverse." And for these taxpayers, it seems likely that
complexity and opacity lead to underestimation of MTRs, on average, and to reduced
labor supply distortions.11 2 In other words, the underestimation of MTR would
mitigate the reduction in labor supply that would follow if high-income individuals
understood their actual MTRs and acted accordingly.
For low-income individuals the picture is somewhat more complex. First, it is not
only high-income taxpayers who experience MTRs in excess of statutory rates and
who would underestimate their MTRs if they focused on the latter. Low-income
individuals often face exceptionally high MTRs as a result of a confluence of phaseouts. For example, examining 2010 data, Molly Sherlock finds that 20% of taxpayers
11 3
in the 10% statutory bracket faced an MTR at least 10 percentage points higher.
In other words, for these taxpayers, MTRs are twice statutory rates or more.

109. Briefing Book: Key Elements of the US. Tax System: Should the AMT Replace the
RegularIncome Tax? TAx POL'Y CTR. (May 2020),

http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/4.5.5should_the_amtreplace _theregular incometax.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYZ5-YDSC]; see
also Rosanne Altshuler & Jacob Goldin, The Opacity of MarginalTax Rates, 125 TAx

NOTES 335, 335 (2009) (using the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation
Model and estimating that 80% of AMT-paying taxpayers faced an EMTR in excess of their
statutory rate for 2009).

110. Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, The AMT: Projections and
Problems, 100 TAx NOTES 105, 115 (2003).

111. Using 2010 IRS Statistics of Income data, Sherlock estimates that 42.5% of taxpayers
in the 25% bracket faced an MTR above their statutory rate and only 1.8% below; that 54%
of taxpayers in the 28% bracket faced a higher MTR and only 1% a lower; and that 76.8% of
taxpayers in the 33% bracket faced a higher MTR and 9.6% a lower. To be sure, because very
high-income taxpayers would have fully passed through the AMT exemption phase-out, only
3.6% of taxpayers in the 35% bracket faced an MTR in excess of statutory rates in 2010, while
45.5% faced a lower MTR. However, fewer than 1% of taxpayers were in the 35% bracket in
2010. Note also that, like today, the personal exemption and itemized deduction phase-outs
were not in place in 2010. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RES. SERV., R44787, STATUTORY
AVERAGE AND EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES IN THE FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX:

16, 2017).
112. An important set of provisions of the Jobs Act complicates this picture somewhat.
Newly enacted § 199A provides a 20% deduction for the qualified business income of certain
taxpayers. For taxpayers entitled to the full deduction, this provision effectively reduces MTRs
by 20% of the statutory rate. A taxpayer who was unaware of this provision and focused on
the statutory rate would overestimate MTR and potentially oversupply labor, all else equal.
However, the § 199A deduction phases out with income. Section 199A eligible taxpayers
within the phase-out range can face MTRs well in excess of statutory rates. Libin Zhang,
MarginalIncome Tax Rates of the PassthroughBusiness Deduction, 159 TAX NOTES 1139,
1139 (2018). In these situations, of course, a taxpayer focused on her statutory rate would
underestimate MTR and potentially undersupply labor. See id. (estimating that in the § 199A
phase-out range, EMTRs in 2018 can exceed 60%).
113. SHERLOCK, supra note 111, at 13. See also David Altig, Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 32 (Mar.
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But two factors run in the other direction for low-income taxpayers. First, tax
expenditures sometimes incorporate phase-in provisions that create wage subsidies
across a significant income range for low-income taxpayers. Consider the EITC. The
EITC phase-in reduces MTRs in a fashion analogous to the increase in MTR that
flows from the phase-out. For example, the EITC phases in at a 34% rate for
taxpayers with one qualifying child." 4 Within the phase-in range, these taxpayers
receive a credit of 34 cents for every additional dollar earned. Generally, taxpayers
within the EITC phase-in range face a zero statutory rate and thus an MTR of
negative 34% once the EITC phase-in is factored in.1 1 5 Individuals who fail to
consider the EITC phase-in might overestimate their MTR and work less than they
would if their MTR were transparent. In this case complexity and opacity amplify
the distortions of the labor income tax.11 6
In addition, some studies have found that the tax rate that is most salient for
individuals is the highest statutory rate. 11 7 If low-income individuals make labor
supply decisions based on this rate rather than their lower statutory rate or even MTR,
they will again undersupply labor amplifying the distortion of the income tax. This
is less of a problem for high-income taxpayers whose income places them in or near
the highest bracket to begin with.

In sum, although the evidence that taxpayers tend to underestimate their MTRs is
less than fully robust, it is consistent with the observation that the complicated phaseouts of deductions, credits, and AMT exemptions are more likely to result in
underestimation than the reverse, at least for middle to high-income taxpayers. To
the extent that taxpayers respond to these lower perceived MTRs, complexity and
opacity likely reduce distortions and excess burden. In this sense, complexity and
opacity may serve to increase social welfare.
3. Deterred Cheating and Welfare-Reducing Planning
Transparency facilitates tax planning and certainly not all tax planning is welfare
enhancing. Indeed, David Weisbach argues that tax planning is worse than
worthless.1 18 Tax planning, in his view, is equivalent to taxpayers doing backflips to

J. Kotlikoff, Elias Ilin & Victor Ye, Marginal Taxation ofAmerican's Labor Supply (Nat.

Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 27164, 2020) (taking into account phase-outs of
non-tax benefits as well as phase-outs under state and federal tax law and finding that one in
four low-income workers faced EMTRs in excess of 70%) https://www.nber.org/system/files/
workingpapers/w27164/w27164.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU53-C5WV].
114. I.R.C. § 32(b).
115. Likely as a result of the EITC phase-in, Sherlock finds that 44% of taxpayers in the
0% bracket in 2010 faced a negative MTR. SHERLOCK, supra note 111, at 32.
116. Similarly, the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit phases in at a 15% rate for
taxpayers with earned income above $3000. See I.R.C. §24(d)(1).
117. See McCaffery, supra note 27, at 1887.
118. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REv. 215, 222 (2002).
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reduce taxes. 119 If everyone does backflips, the revenue raised from each taxpayer
must be unaffected in equilibrium. 120 The only difference, before and after, is all the
backflips. If only some taxpayers do backflips, these taxpayers impose externalities
on those that abstain. 121 While there are certainly exceptions, which even Weisbach
notes, there is truth to his observation. 122 Given a fixed revenue requirement, a
taxpayer's expenditure of time and energy to reduce her taxes is socially wasteful.
And whatever one thinks about "good" tax planning, some tax planning, equating to
evasion or cheating, clearly is socially wasteful.
If transparency facilitates planning (including cheating) by laying out a roadmap
for technical compliance or reported compliance, as some have argued, 123 then
complexity and opacity deter planning. Again consider the EITC. An EITC
recipient's credit is maximized when her earned income reaches a certain threshold.
That threshold is an inflation adjusted figure that depends on whether the taxpayer
has qualifying children and, if so, the number of qualifying children. 124 Given the
annual inflation adjustments, the threshold is a moving target. Suppose a taxpayer
with non-wage income (and a less than finely tuned moral compass) decides that she
would like to report income equal to the threshold in order to maximize her tax
credit. 125 If the threshold were a fixed, transparent, round number amount widely
understood within the community, doing so would be fairly easy. But it is much more
difficult to hit an obscure moving target. In fact, if one Googles "EITC" or "EITC
maximum credit" one can quickly learn the maximum credit for a given year and the
income level at which the credit completely phases out, but not the income level
associated with achieving the maximum credit. 126 One has to work very hard, I found,
to uncover this critical bit of information.
D. Negative Aspects ofIncreasing Tax Complexity and Opacity
Complexity can support a more accurate tax system and complexity and opacity
can work to mitigate labor supply distortions and deadweight loss if taxpayers
systematically underestimate MTRs and deter, or at least not promote, cheating. But
there are many countervailing costs. First, as noted above, if individuals

119. Id.
120. Id. at 223 ("Holding government spending constant, everyone's taxes are exactly the
same with and without the backflip shelter, except that with the backflip, nominal taxes are
higher and then are reduced by the tax gymnastics.").
121. Id. at 223 (viewing tax planning by some as an externality imposed on others).
122. See id. at 224 (recognizing that changes in behavior intended to satisfy explicit tax
incentives may be socially valuable); see also, Manoj Viswanathan, Lower-Income Tax
Planning, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 195 (arguing that low-income tax planning is often efficient).
123. See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 75, at 1420 n.63 ("If the law provides a clear
rule and the regulated individual would prefer to circumvent that rule, then certainty provides
a road map for avoidance.").
124. I.R.C. § 32.
125. Given third party reporting of W-2 wage income to the IRS, taxpayers reporting only
W-2 wages have no real scope for misreporting their income for EITC purposes.
126. EITC Maximum Credit, GOoGLE, http://google.com [https://perma.cc/3DVG-7C6H]
(search for EITC Maximum Credit and open the first several links).
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systematically overestimate MTRs, this would amplify labor supply distortions and
increase deadweight loss. This scenario seems unlikely for high-income individuals,
but possible for low-income individuals in the EITC phase-in range. But even
assuming systematic underestimation of MTR across the board and reduction of
deadweight loss, there are a number of potentially offsetting negative factors.
1. Suboptimal Decision Making
Tax complexity and opacity could lead to suboptimal decision making. Most
obviously, systematic underestimation of MTRs may lead to individuals working
more than they would if fully and accurately informed. This may be personally
suboptimal, but obviously this is just the flip side of reduced labor supply distortion,
which we generally view as a plus. But more generally, complexity and opacity
impede basic tax planning and decision making that no one would find objectionable.
A taxpayer who is unaware of phase-outs and underestimates her MTR may sock
away less of her earnings in qualified retirement vehicles or give less of her money
to charity than she would if she understood that the after-tax cost of these decisions
was much less than she anticipated. A taxpayer on the cusp of the AMT may be
unable to determine the tax benefit associated with various expenditures, such as the
property taxes she would pay if she purchased a home. 1 7 Other opaque limitations
on deductions or credits may result in taxpayers making suboptimally large
expenditures on, for example, higher education or home improvements, without
realizing that the purported tax benefits are limited or largely illusionary. 128

2. Ineffective Tax Incentives
Many of the most complex tax provisions faced by individuals involve explicit
tax incentives or subsidies that Congress has elected to implement through the

127. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 35, at 103.

128. Tax complexity and opacity could also potentially lead to suboptimal budgeting and
consumption choices if individuals who underestimate their MTRs also underestimate their
aggregate tax burden. This possibility has received considerable attention in the context of
low-salience consumption taxes. Chetty et al., supranote 79, at 1173-74; Gamage & Shanske,
supra note 26, at 66-68; Nussim, supra note 42, at 242. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft provide an

example in which a consumer purchases a certain car, unaware of a tax on the car purchase
that will leave insufficient funds for necessities. Chetty et al., supra note 79, at 1174 (noting
that the effect of inattention depends on how the consumer adjusts her budget in light of the
tax, whether the consumer is credit constrained, etc.). Other commentators have questioned
the significance of this distortionary income effect, however, and have argued that it is less
likely to arise from misperception of income tax rates. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 26, at
67-68 (arguing that given taxpayer learning these distortionary income effects are of limited
importance unless low-salience taxes affect irregular expenditures and there are long delays
between purchase and assessment of tax); Nussim, supra note 42, at 254 (arguing that the
potential drawbacks of misperceived consumption taxes generally do not apply to wage taxes
given, inter alia, taxpayers' ability to learn and respond to nontransparent taxation). Accurate
withholding would seem to resolve budgeting problems even in the face of complexity and
opacity. I thank Leigh Osofsky for this observation.
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income tax. These incentives and subsidies include the EITC, education credits, and
retirement savings incentives. 129 As Larry Zelenak notes, tax incentives are less
effective if taxpayers don't recognize them.13 0 The sheer number of incentives, their
individual complexities, and the interplay between them13 1 undermine taxpayer
recognition, understanding, and take-up. Commentators have recognized the tension
between the general goals of reducing behavioral distortions and increasing the
efficiency of the income tax, on the one hand, and promoting the goals underlying
these tax expenditures, on the other. For example, Jacob Goldin has remarked that
raising awareness of the EITC creates a tradeoff between improving the effectiveness
of the incentive and facilitating individual optimization, on the one hand, and
minimizing deadweight loss, on the other. 132
3. Undermined Political Accountability and Fiscal Citizenship
The complexity and opacity of the Code enables Congress to purposefully
obfuscate tax burdens, reduces political accountability, and undermines fiscal
citizenship. While it is often difficult to glean congressional motives from complex
tax provisions, sometimes it isn't. Although temporarily in abeyance, the poster
children for purposeful obfuscation of tax rates have to be the phase-outs of personal
exemptions and itemized deductions. 133 The two are roughly similar in apparent
intent and effect, so we will consider only the phase-out of personal exemptions.
A deduction for personal exemptions-a set amount each year based on the
number of individuals in the filing unit-has been a feature of the income tax since
1913.134 Since 1985, the personal exemption amount for each member of the filing
unit has been indexed for inflation, 135 reaching $4,050 prior to the enactment of the
Jobs Act. 13 6 Between 1988 and 2009, and againbetween 2013 and 2017, the personal
exemption amount was phased down or out for high-income taxpayers. 137 Why?

129. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.

130. Zelenak, supra note 35, at 103-04.
131. To provide just one example, consider the interplay between the § 21 dependent care
credit and the § 129 exclusion for employer-provided dependent care. The maximum amount
creditable under § 21 is reduced by any exclusion under § 129.
132. Goldin, supra note 22, at 106. The EITC creates a tension because it includes a phaseout provision that increases MTRs and reduces work incentives as well as a phase-in provision
with the opposite effect. See § 32(a)-(b).
133. Technically, § 68 phases down itemized deductions to a floor equal to 20% of
itemized deductions before the phase-down and is not truly a phase-out. However, I will refer
to both as phase-out provisions for simplicity.
134. BriefingBook: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: What are PersonalExemptions?,
TAx
POL'Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-personalexemptions [https://perma.cc/SE3W-5F5G] (May 2020).
135.

Stephen J.

Entin, Tax Indexing Turns 30, TAx FOUND.

(Mar.

11, 2015),

https://taxfoundation.org/tax-indexing-turns-30/ [https://perma.cc/7JKW-BJBV].
136. IRS, BULL. 2016-45 707 (2016) (providing inflation-adjusted figures for tax years
beginning in 2017).
137. During some years the phase-out was in effect, there were limits to the amount of
reduction. For a detailed explanation, see IRS, TABLE 23. U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX:
PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS AND LOWEST AND HIGHEST TAx BRACKET TAx RATES AND TAx BASE
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There is no plausible reason other than as a hidden or low-salience means of raising
additional tax revenue from this population of taxpayers. The highest statutory MTR
has high political salience. 138 It is this number that citizens generally focus upon in
considering whether "taxes" are too high, too low, or about right, and, of course, a
significant fraction of the population generally believes the answer to be "too high."
Thus, it is no surprise that a means of raising additional tax revenue from taxpayers
in the highest bracket, without adjusting that bracket, would be a means of avoiding
political accountability for taxes and a particularly popular option for policy makers.
And that is just what Congress has done, repeatedly, by phasing out personal
exemptions and itemized deductions.
How might complexity facilitate this move? If one can imagine a truly simple tax
system focused on measuring income and including no tax expenditures, the
enactment of phase-outs of personal exemptions or itemized deductions would likely
be a fairly transparent end run around statutory rate increases and for that reason
might never have happened. But given an already complicated Code with numerous
phase-outs of tax expenditure deductions and credits, the addition of two more phaseouts may have seemed less exceptional and notable.
The personal exemption and itemized deduction phase-outs are examples of
purposeful obfuscation that both benefit from and increase tax complexity and reduce
political accountability. But tax complexity may undermine fiscal citizenship even
when the effect is unintended. In his excellent book, Learning to Love Form 1040:
Two Cheers for the Return-Based Mass Income Tax, Larry Zelenak defends our
broadly applicable, return-based tax system against critics such as Michael Graetz,
who would prefer to return the income tax to its roots as a tax on high-income
individuals only. 139 Zelenak's defense is based primarily on fiscal citizenship and the
idea that the process of filing taxes encourages citizens to think more deeply about
the tax system and about the fiscal state more generally. Excessive complexity
undermines fiscal citizenship,
in Zelenak's view. "Taxation without
comprehension," he argues, "is as inimical to democracy as taxation without
representation."1"
4. The Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion Problems
Related to the forgoing, some commentators argue that complexity and opacity,
particularly when remedied by black box software, may lead to suboptimally large
government. The idea here is that if taxpayers don't comprehend their liability-if
taxes are low salience and if compliance is relatively painless-and if public goods

FOR REGULAR TAx, TAx YEARS 1913-2018,

https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-

historical-table-23 [https://perma.cc/KBD7-QBCF] (Nov. 5, 2021).
138. McCaffery refers to the highest rate bracket as being "socially prominent" and argues
this prominence places constraints on legislators. See McCaffery, supra note 27, at 1887, 1905.
139. See ZELENAK, supra note 1 (reacting to MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION
UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAx PLAN FOR THE UNITED
STATES (2008)).

140. Id. at 114. Interestingly, Zelenak is a fan of prepopulated return systems, such as
California's Ready Return experiment. In his view, the minimal requirement that citizens at
least sign and return pre-populated returns is sufficient to engender fiscal citizenship. Id. at 6.
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are more salient, taxpayers may support a larger government providing more services
than they would if all were transparent and clearly understood.141
These arguments stem from the Leviathan hypothesis and the theory of fiscal
illusion. As Edward McCaffery describes,
The basic idea of the Leviathan hypothesis is that governments, or any
bureaucracy generally, continually expand. It is as if a government were
a living organism . . .. Fiscal illusion is a more specific theory that holds
that individuals are likely to exaggerate the benefits and underestimate
the costs of certain large public projects or public goods generally....
Taxes add to and enrich the basic fiscal illusion/ Leviathan story. Any
degree of hiddeness [sic] in a tax structure plays directly into the
prominence aspects of the fiscal illusion effect .... 142
While this fiscal illusion or Leviathan theory of the size of government is possible,
Galle notes that evidence supporting this story is inconclusive. 143 Moreover, David
Gamage and Darien Shanske argue that there is no baseline for determining whether
the political salience of taxes is too high or too low, and thus we can draw no useful
conclusions about whether any relationship between tax salience and the size of
government is socially valuable or costly, assuming that such a linkage exists at all. 144
5. Impact on Taxpayer Autonomy, Rights to Transparency, and Fairness
Related to the problem of impaired decision-making, but broader, is a concern
that complexity and opacity undermine taxpayer autonomy. McCaffery, for one,
questions the purposeful use of cognitive error, such as employing low-salience
taxes, even in pursuit of noble, liberal goals. 14 5 Joshua Blank and Leigh Osofsky note
that the IRS has adopted a taxpayer bill of rights, which includes a right to be
informed and a right to clear explanation of tax laws and IRS procedures. 146 In
contemplating a world in which technology may allow the production of tax returns
with little or no input from taxpayers, Blank and Osofsky worry that "the public stops

141. Milton Friedman publicly regretted his role in the introduction of the federal income
tax withholding system during World War II. In Friedman's view, the withholding system
made the income tax less visible and more acceptable, leading to growth in government. See
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, TwO LUCKY PEOPLE: MEMOIRS 123 (1998); see also,
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAx REFORM, NINTH MEETING 119 (May 17, 2005)

(statement of Grover G. Norquist, President, Americans for Tax Reform) ("[M]oving to a socalled return-free system will reduce people's understanding of what exactly they're paying
and their [reduced] focus on it will make it easier to raise taxes.").
142. McCaffery, supra note 27, at 1927-28 (citations omitted). Finkelstein traces the
theory of fiscal illusion to John Stuart Mill and notes the importance of James Buchanan's
work in this area. Finkelstein, supra note 85, at 970.
143. Galle, supra note 83, at 98.
144. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 26, at 79-80.
145. McCaffery, supra note 27, at 1943.
146. Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 66
EMORY L.J. 189, 199 (2017); Blank & Osofsky, supra note 41, at 194.
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understanding what the law is," which seems to run counter to the right to be
informed. 147
Finally, opacity and complexity will often lead to outcomes for taxpayers that
many will view as unfair. If taxpayers make expenditures that they reasonably expect
will provide tax benefits, perhaps in response to specific incentives created by
Congress, but later learn that the tax benefit was subject to an opaque limitation and
thus was reduced or eliminated, this simply seems unfair.14 8
E. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Tax Complexity and Opacity
In terms of overall social welfare, the complexity and opacity of the Code likely
result in a tradeoff between reduced excess burden, on the one hand, and individual
losses due to suboptimization and perhaps impeded political accountability, on the
other. Commentators vary in their assessment of the net impact on social welfare. 14 9
In my view, the potential reductions in labor supply distortion and cheating
associated with complexity and opacity are attractive features. On the other hand, I
worry about suboptimal decision making and impairment of tax incentives,
particularly at the low end of the income distribution. Further, although it simply

147. Blank & Osofsky, supra note 41, at 187.
148. This situation can arise even with relatively straightforward Code provisions.
Itemized deductions, for example, provide tax benefits only to the extent that they exceed the
standard deduction, in aggregate. Thus, taxpayers who donate used vehicles to charity in
response to advertisements touting tax benefits and later find that the tax benefit is small or
nonexistent may feel aggrieved. See Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable
Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1307, 1320-23 (2012).
However, as long as the tax rules are straightforward and easily accessible, sympathy will
likely be limited. Once the complexity of the rules and interplay of rules creates a high degree
of opacity, fairness arguments seem more compelling.
149. For example, Gamage and Shanske argue that reducing the economic or "market"
salience of taxes is socially valuable because the reduction in distortions and deadweight loss
is a first-order effect, while income effects, externalities, and distributional effects are second
order. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 26, at 60-79. With respect to political salience,
Gamage and Shanske are agnostic, emphasizing that there is no coherent baseline for
determining the optimal political salience of taxes. Id. at 79. To be sure, Gamage and Shanske
focus on salience, not complexity, and the additional downsides of complexity might suggest
a different result for them. Galle concludes that the social welfare effects of hidden taxes are
indeterminate and that the answer depends, at least in part, on the mechanism through which
taxes are hidden. Galle, supranote 83, at 64 (arguing that "[h]iddentaxes are likely progressive
in a rational ignorance model, but regressive otherwise"). Again, there is not one-to-one
correspondence between complex taxes and hidden taxes, but significant overlap. Schenk
cautiously supports exploitation of low-salience taxes, primarily on political economy
grounds. Schenk, supra note 25, at 284. She is somewhat more cautious about the use of
complexity to reduce salience given other costs to complexity. Id. at 286. Zelenak, on the other
hand, tends to focus on the downsides of complexity; in particular, the adverse impact on fiscal
citizenship. Zelenak, supra note 35, at 102-03; Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph
Kramden, andthe Civic Virtues ofa Return FilingRequirement, 61 TAxL. REv. 53, 66 (2007).

McCaffery, as noted above, has expressed discomfort with purposeful exploitation of
cognitive error, i.e., exploitation of complex and low-salience taxes, on both practical and
moral grounds. McCaffery, supra note 27, at 1943.

2022]

TAX COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY

1123

reflects my own biases, I am less concerned about a high-income taxpayer
underestimating her MTR and working "too much" as a result of deduction or credit
phase-outs or the AMT than I am about a low-income taxpayer missing out on the
EITC.
III. How TAX PLANNING SOFTWARE CAN (AND LIKELY WILL) ADDRESS THE
COMPLEXITY AND OPACITY OF THE INCOME TAX

It is important to understand the costs and benefits of tax complexity, but
ultimately the question of whether complexity and opacity, on net, reduce or increase
social welfare is in one sense beside the point of this Article. A primary claim here
is that technology can, and likely will, render the black box functionally transparent,
at least for high-income taxpayers who are willing to pay the fare, for good or ill.
This Part discusses the potential of tax planning software to re-create transparency.
The following Parts evaluate currently available technology and make the case for
government intervention in this arena and bring us back to the costs and benefits of
complexity, asking if we can preserve the benefits while mitigating the costs.
I start with the proposition that the primary concern with a federal income tax
black box is that taxpayers cannot readily understand the relationship between their
life decisions and their tax burdens, which I refer to as a lack of functional
transparency. The problem is not that taxpayers can't master the calculation of the
phase-out of personal exemptions, for example, but that taxpayers don't understand
how much of their next dollar of income they'll keep after tax. It isn't that the EITC
phase-in calculations are complex, per se, but that taxpayers don't realize how much
additional income they'll receive on net from taking a higher-paying job. The
problem isn't so much the difficulty of wading through the plethora of mutually
exclusive education incentives, as it is just knowing that tax incentives for higher
education exist and estimating the tax benefit.
Technology can easily address these problems. It can do so in three basic ways.
First, tax planning software can be used to run "what if' scenarios illuminating the
association between life decisions and tax. Second, planning software can be used to
alert taxpayers to tax incentives, both recurring and one-time incentives. Third, and
more generally, software can be used to educate taxpayers, to improve their
understanding of the tax system from a functional perspective.
A. Running "What If' Scenarios
Many of us use software to prepare our tax returns. We input or download our
various items of income and expense, and our withheld or estimated tax payments,
or both, and the software calculates how much additional tax we owe or the amount
of our refund. And then we have a beer and celebrate the fact that that chore is done
for another year.
But what most of us fail to realize is that we have also created a tool that could be
used for tax planning. Once all of this information has been collected, we could easily
run "what if' scenarios to determine the marginal effect of our decisions. 0 To be

150. This statement assumes, of course, that the software was designed to support "what
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sure, what we have done is to create a baseline for the year past, not the year ahead,
but for many of us, the past year is a reasonable starting place for thinking about the
year or years ahead, and the tax impact of marginal adjustments to the past year's
data is likely to carry over to the next year.
The range of "what ifs" is almost limitless. How will my taxes be affected if I
earn another $1000? If I have another child? If I donate a used car to charity? This is
the sort of information that taxpayers need in order to make decisions in an optimal
fashion. Of course, taxpayers who are fully informed in this fashion are more likely
to adjust their labor supply to reflect their actual MTR,151 which may not be socially
optimal. But at this stage, I am evaluating what planning software can do to render
the black box functionally transparent, not whether it should be done.
As long as the relationship between life decisions and tax is a continuous function,
"what if' scenario exploration should provide the information that taxpayers need to
make those decisions effectively. And generally, those relationships are continuous.
Phase-outs are typically smooth. Consider, for example, the phase-out of the EITC.152
For taxpayers with two qualifying children, the EITC phases out at a 21.06% rate;
that is, for each dollar of income above the phase-out threshold, these taxpayers lose
about 21 cents of credit until the credit vanishes.1 5 3
Some tax provisions, however, create cliff effects that make planning somewhat
more difficult. For example, § 222 provides up to a $4000 deduction for qualified
college tuition and related expenses for single taxpayers with AGI of $65,000 or less
and a $2000 deduction for single taxpayers with AGI between $65,000 and
$80,000.154 A single taxpayer with AGI of $65,000 who added another $1000 of
income would see her § 222 deduction reduced by $2000, which would mean, all
else equal, that $1000 of additional pretax income would result in $1000 less income
after tax. Given the cliff and the many other factors that could affect on which side
of the cliff the taxpayer fell, planning for this taxpayer is complicated.
Nonetheless, in cases in which tax provisions create discontinuities, planning
software could alert taxpayers who are near a cliff as to the issue. For taxpayers far
from the cliff, the provisions are essentially continuous and no more problematic
than smooth phase-outs.
B. Tax Incentive Alerts
A second problem with tax system opacity is that taxpayers may misperceive tax
incentives or even have no idea that certain tax incentives exist. Here again, planning
software can largely mitigate the problem by highlighting these incentives.
Let's return to our taxpayer who has just prepared and submitted her return using
software that supports "what if' planning. Suppose the taxpayer is an EITC recipient.
Of course, the taxpayer might run a "what if' scenario that would reveal her actual

if' planning. Whether and to what extent commercially available planning software does so is
the topic of the following Part.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. I.R.C. § 32.
153. Id. § 32(b).
154. Id. § 222 (2012). The §222 deduction expired on December 31, 2020. However, the
provision has expired before, and in each case, Congress opted to extend the provision.
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MTR given her position along the phase-in, plateau, or phase-out range of the
EITC,1 5 5 but the taxpayer might not think to do so. Given the complexity of the EITC
and the likelihood that a recipient's MTR will differ from her statutory rate, planning
software could be used to proactively alert and educate taxpayers as to the EITC. The
software could specify the break points in the EITC schedule for the following year,
explain in simple terms the size of the tax subsidy or penalty in the phase-in and
phase-out range, and provide generally useful information about the EITC, e.g., that
it varies with number of kids and marital status, etc.
Suppose a taxpayer has listed a number of itemized deductions, but the standard
deduction exceeds (or is slightly less than) the total of itemized deductions. Again,
the taxpayer might or might not run a "what if' scenario that reveals that her itemized
deductions are not reducing her taxes (or reducing tax only minimally), but she might
fail to do so. Given this common situation, the software might be designed to
affirmatively alert the taxpayer that only deductions in excess of a calculated dollar
amount for the following year will reduce her taxes. 156
Suppose a taxpayer lists a dependent child who is in her early or mid-teens. The
taxpayer may be unaware of the various tax credits and other tax incentives available
for higher education. The child's age could trigger an alert that highlights these
incentives and directs the taxpayer to other sources for further information.
C. Improving Taxpayer Understandingof the Tax System
In each of these cases, software could be used to mitigate the opacity and
complexity of the Code, returning taxpayers to the level of understanding that they
held when the system was simpler and most returns were prepared by hand. But in
some cases, the software could potentially go further, rendering the tax system more
transparent and understandable than in the hand-prepared return "golden age." And
this brings me to the third way that technology can address complexity-by
improving taxpayer understanding of the tax system from a functional perspectivea substitute for and improvement upon learning by doing.
One of the purported benefits of filling out tax returns by hand is that by so doing
the taxpayer learns about the provisions that are applicable to her situation. This
could very well be true for repetitive situations. For example, a taxpayer might think
that her $500 donation to the Red Cross would reduce her taxes, but after completing
her return by hand, she might learn that the standard deduction was greater than her
total itemized deductions, and as a result her donation provided her no tax benefit.

155. As discussed supra note 24, the design of the EITC includes an income range across
which the credit phases in and acts as a wage subsidy, an income range across which a recipient
receives the maximum credit (the plateau), and an income range across which the credit is
phased out.
156. It is even conceivable that the software could explain that creating a donor-advised
fund and bunching charitable contributions into a single year could minimize taxes, given the
Jobs Act increase in the standard deduction and other modifications to itemized deductions.
See, e.g., Donor-Advised Funds and Tax Law Changes: UnderstandingHow New Tax Law
Changes May
Impact
Your
Philanthropy, NAT'L
PHILANTHROPIC
TR.,

https://www.nptrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/DAFs-and-Tax-Law-Changes-NPT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZAV2-WRU8].
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Going forward, she would understand this and potentially modify her behavior if the
lack of a tax benefit was important to her.
But what about new situations? The first year that a taxpayer preparing her own
return by hand pays college tuition for a dependent child, she may learn about
education tax credits (if she is diligent), but she's less likely to learn about education
credits in the years leading up to her child's matriculation when the prospect of the
credit might have affected the decision of when and where to attend college. In this
situation, software that alerts taxpayers to potentially applicable tax provisions on
the horizon is better than learning by doing taxes.
Another way that planning software could improve upon learning by doing is by
mitigating common taxpayer errors. Tax planning software can play an important
role in distinguishing MTRs from statutory rates in cases in which taxpayers are
subject to various floors, phase-ins, phase-outs, or the AMT. Well-informed,
economically sophisticated taxpayers will, of course, make incremental decisions
based upon their MTRs, but some research suggests that taxpayers fail to account for
these adjustments. 157 Other research suggests that some taxpayers fail to understand
the basic difference between average and marginal tax rates and erroneously make
decisions based on average rates. 158 As long as we have a tax system with a
progressive rate schedule, which is important in maintaining progressivity, 159 MTRs
will exceed average rates on ordinary income, and the potential for misapplying
average rates will exist. Learning by doing will not correct the error, but software
that explicitly determines effective MTRs and, more importantly, frames this rate as
the fraction of the next $100 or $1000 earned that goes to federal taxes could help
mitigate this problem.
IV. TAX PLANNING SOFTWARE TODAY

Tax preparationsoftware is now ubiquitous. In a 2014 hearing, the Commissioner
of the IRS reported that 34% of individual filers utilized tax preparation software,
while another 56% turned to professional preparers, almost all of whom would have
utilized software to prepare these returns. 160 That leaves about 10% of individual
taxpayers using paper and pencil. While the software providers seem to be focused
primarily on tax preparation products, many also offer tax planning products. There
161
are at least thirty-nine tax planning software products on the market today.

157. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
159. A progressive rate schedule is not vital to progressivity. Progressivity could be
accomplished with a single tax rate and large uniform cash transfers or "demogrants." See
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at

Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1945 (1987) (stating that one result of the
optimal tax model is that "a progressive tax is best implemented through demogrants combined
with constant or even declining marginal rates"). But the demogrant approach to progressivity
is likely to be a nonstarter politically.
160. ProtectingTaxpayers, supra note 65, at 131.

161. A list of these products is provided in the Appendix. This list does not include a
number of tax preparation software products that include no tax-planning functions.
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Tax planning software ranges from simplistic to highly sophisticated. The most
sophisticated products are marketed to professional preparers who advise multiple
taxpayers. In many cases, professional planning software is integrated with tax
preparation software, or the preparer can export data from the preparation software
to the planning software. If broadly utilized, the most sophisticated tax planning
software available today would go some way towards restoring the functional
transparency of the tax system. However, the products currently offered to individual
taxpayers certainly do not meet that standard, and the extent to which professional
preparers use planning software to improve their clients' understanding of the tax
system is unclear.
There is great variety in the functionality of tax planning software, and the line
between tax preparation software and tax planning software is murky. Consider
products like TurboTax and TaxAct. 162 These are tax preparation software products
aimed at individual taxpayers eschewing the use of professional preparers. The
emphasis is on ensuring that users identify all possible deductions and credits (as
well as income items, of course) for the current tax year, so as to avoid paying more
tax than is owed. These products include numerous prompts to help users identify
allowable credits and deductions, and these prompts serve an educative function in
addition to their primary function of minimizing reported taxable income. 6 3 These
products could even be used to run "what if' scenarios to illuminate the impact of
various life decisions on tax burdens, but these products are not designed for this
function and using them in this manner would be inconvenient, to say the least. Aside
from alerting users to current-year deductions and credits, these programs do nothing
to highlight tax incentives or issues that might be on the horizon.
The makers of both TurboTax and TaxAct offer rudimentary tax planning
software as well. TurboTax offers TaxCaster, which it bills as a tax refund
estimator.164 TaxCaster is a free, stand-alone product. It is not integrated with
TurboTax's preparation software, and it allows users to input various items of
income and expense, withholding, and other information that it uses to generate a
bottom-line tax owed or refunded figure. Because TaxCaster utilizes fewer fields
than TurboTax, it is conceivably easier to use for simple tax planning. However, a
user cannot adjust inputs without starting the process over, so TaxCaster's utility in
this service is limited. The product seems to exist largely as advertising for
TurboTax's tax preparation software.
TaxAct offers a simplistic but potentially educative Tax Bracket Calculator that
determines a user's statutory tax rate and average tax rate based on seven inputs as
well as a thirty-field Tax Refund Calculator that allows users to vary inputs and

162.

TurboTax, INTUIT, https://turbotax.intuit.com/); TAxACT, https://www.taxact.com/.

163. To provide just a few examples, TaxAct's input screens note that contributions to a
traditional IRA can reduce taxes, while contributions to a Roth IRA would not; highlight the
floor on deductions for medical expenses; and explain that itemized deductions are only useful
to the extent they exceed the standard deduction. See TAxACT, https://www.taxact.com/
(showing "Pro Tips" as users input their data). TurboTax's input screens provide similarly
useful

and

educative

notes.

See

TurboTax,

INTUIT,

https://turbotax.intuit.com/

[https://perma.cc/3FPT-UGDD] (showing "explain why" tips as users input their data).
164. Tax Calculator 2021: TaxCaster, INTUIT, https://turbotax.intuit.com/taxtools/calculators/taxcaster/ [https://perma.cc/CP7R-RDRZ].

1128

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:1095

recalculate tax owed. This product could be used to run "what if' scenarios by
taxpayers with relatively simple tax situations. 16 5
The bottom line, however, is that "tax planning" products aimed at individual
taxpayers do not provide the tools needed to render the Code functionally
transparent. Tax planning software marketed to professional preparers, on the other
hand, is much more powerful.
The leading products in this class, including Lacerte Tax Planner, CCH
ProSystem fx Planning, and Drake Tax Planner, are sophisticated, integrated
planning products.166 Because these products are offered to professional preparers,
who presumably know the tax laws, there is relatively less emphasis on providing
the kinds of educative tax "tips" that one finds in TurboTax and TaxAct. But this
function is not entirely absent either, and, because these planning products are
integrated with tax preparation software or start with data exported from taxpayer
returns, these tips are not generic, but are tailored to particular taxpayer
circumstances. 16 7
Planning software aimed at professional preparers generally provides little
guidance with respect to tax incentives that lie beyond the immediate horizon of the
current tax year and next. I found no examples of software that would alert a preparer
with respect to education credits that might soon come into play for a taxpayer with
a teenage child, for example. This is not too surprising, given that the audience for
these products is professional preparers who would not typically need this kind of
prompt to have a conversation with their clients about topics such as this. This should
be bread-and-butter work for tax advisors.
Where the best planning products really shine, however, is in facilitating "what
if' planning. Again, because these products are integrated with tax preparation
software, they start with a taxpayer's actual tax situation and allow preparers to
hypothetically adjust for a new job, a new child, a move to a different state, etc., and
quickly and easily compare the tax consequences of the various scenarios. Lacerte,
for example, boasts that its planning software allows preparers to "compare multiple,
complex scenarios using actual current and future year tax rates." 168 CCH Pro System
fx Planning allows a planner to "forecast and compare up to 30 different tax scenarios
with 8 years of projection data per plan." 169 These products even include features

165. Taxpayers with more complex situations would likely be stymied by, for example, the
prompt to enter their qualified business income deduction.
166. See,
e.g.,
Lacerte
Tax,
INTUIT,
https://proconnect.intuit.com/lacerte/
[https://perma.cc/AG5Y-USS9]; The CCH ProSystem fx Suite, WOLTERS KLUWER,

https://taxna.wolterskluwer.com/professional-tax-software/prosystem-fx
[https://perma.cc/
7ERF-RBMK]; DRAKE SOFTWARE, drakesoftware.com [https://perma.cc/SGD7-ZF4B].
167. For example, in its marketing materials, Lacerte provides an analysis of the tax return
for a hypothetical taxpayer that highlights unused opportunities to reduce tax by, e.g., fully
participating in qualified retirement plans, accelerating certain itemized deductions, or even
employing a child under the age of eighteen in the family business. Lacerte, supra note 166.
168. Lacerte, supra note 166.

169. Tax & Accounting Software: The CCH Prosystem fx Suite, WOLTERS KLUWER,
https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/solutions/cch-prosystem-fx
[https://perma.cc/LC3S3Y6L].
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allowing preparers to quickly prepare reports for their clients, including charts
comparing the outcomes of various scenarios. 170
To what extent does tax planning software bring clarity to the black box of federal
income taxation today? Software aimed at individuals preparing their own returnsboth preparation and planning software-serves an educative function by
highlighting generic tax tips and providing simple bracket analyses. This software is
focused, however, on identifying current tax year deductions and credits and
estimating or determining tax. This software is not useful for conducting "what if'
scenario analyses or for calling taxpayers' attention to tax incentives that may be
approaching on the horizon. These products certainly simplify compliance, but users
are still likely to see the tax system as a black box.
Professional preparers could bring clarity to their clients by combining their
knowledge and experience with the sophisticated planning products at their disposal.
Their knowledge and experience would allow them to advise their clients with
respect to tax provisions with which their clients may not be aware, and the planning
software would allow them to easily illuminate the tax consequences of various life
decisions their clients face. Given this, one might expect that taxpayers who utilize
professional preparers would be better informed. But as several commentators have
observed, the use of professional preparers may actually reduce taxpayer awareness
of tax considerations if taxpayers essentially delegate return preparation and filing to
professional preparers.171
The limited empirical evidence supports this more pessimistic view. In a surveybased study of taxpayer awareness of their MTRs reported in 1995, Rupert and
Fischer found that taxpayers who used professional preparers were less accurate than
other taxpayers in estimating their MTRs. 17 2 More recently, Ballard and Gupta
surveyed 978 adult residents of Michigan, soliciting their estimation of their average
federal income tax rate. 173 Almost 85% of respondents overestimated their average
rates, with a mean over-estimation of 11.6 percentage points. 174 Respondents who
reported using a professional preparer overestimated their average rates by nearly
three percentage points more than self-preparers, all else equal. 175
Before concluding this Part, I would be remiss if I did not mention one very
different and very promising technological advance in tax analysis offered by Blue J
Legal.17 6 Blue J Legal harnesses artificial intelligence and big data to predict the
results of difficult borderline tax questions, such as whether a financial instrument
would be characterized as debt or equity or whether a worker would be classified as
an employee or independent contractor. 177 To be sure, Blue J Legal is itself a black
box, but the software provides probabilities that its characterizations are correct and
allows users to test various sensitivities, which assists in effective planning and

170. Id.
171. Rupert & Fischer, supra note 59, at 40; Feldman & Katuscak, supra note 66, at 3.
172. Rupert & Fischer, supra note 59, at 51 (survey of 108 taxpayers who responded to a
survey instrument and provided tax return information).

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Ballard & Gupta, supra note 62, at 270.
Id. at 264.
See id at 278-79.
BLUE J LEGAL, https://www.bluejlegal.com/ [https://perma.cc/W5KJ-T2U8].
See id
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structuring. Although as currently configured, Blue J Legal is targeted at a specific
set of difficult questions and is not a multi-purpose tax planning tool, it suggests an
17
alternative path forward for tax planning technology.?
V. THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED OR SUBSIDIZED TAX PLANNING
SOFTWARE

Even without AI, existing technology seems sufficient to restore functional
transparency to the increasingly complex tax system. Planning software currently
available to professional preparers is more than adequate for "what if' scenario
analyses that would not only calculate a taxpayer's MTR in various situations but
would explain the relationship between life decisions and tax in a fashion that is
easily digestible and actionable. And it would be straightforward to add individually
tailored prompts highlighting tax incentives that are currently available or that may
be on the horizon. One can think of this as a combination of professional preparer
planning software and professional preparer experience and foresight. This
combination of information could mitigate the black box nature of our tax system to
a significant degree, for good or ill.
This Part of the Article presents the case for government provision or
subsidization of just such software. The argument, in brief, is that the development
of such technology and its availability to high-income taxpayers are probably
inevitable, and as a result, the downsides of widely available software are to some
extent unavoidable, but that government intervention can help shape the technology
in ways that increase social welfare and improve distributional outcomes. I also argue
that government-provided or subsidized planning software should be targeted at
lower-income taxpayers in order to avoid facilitating social welfare reducing tax
planning by high-income taxpayers, and to level the tax planning playing field for
lower-income taxpayers.
Such software could be provided directly by the IRS to lower-income taxpayers
or the government could subsidize the production of such software by for-profit
entities such as Intuit, the maker of TurboTax. I will discuss the pros and cons of
government subsidy versus direct provision in Subsection F, below.
I am not the first to advocate for government-provided tax software. In a 1999
article, Joshua Rosenberg envisioned government-provided tax preparation software
that would be focused on accurate compliance and would highlight tax incentives. 179
Like me, Rosenberg viewed government-provided software as a response to the

178. See id. Ben Alarie, one of the founders of Blue J Legal, foresees Al reducing the cost
of information and increasing the democratization of tax law. Benjamin Alarie, Anthony
Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Law in the Future, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 423, 426 (2016). I am less
sanguine. The fact that technology is available does not mean that it will become affordable
and ubiquitous.
179. Joshua D. Rosenberg, A Helpful and Efficient IRS: Some Simple and Powerful
Suggestions, 88 KY. L.J. 33, 42, 51 (1999). I am also far from the first to discuss how
government-provided software can aid individual decision making. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo,
Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1297 (2017) (discussing and evaluating

government-provided digital intermediaries directed towards assisting consumers with a range
of decisions, including, inter alia, college and mortgage selection).
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increasing complexity and opacity of the Code. 180 More recently and further afield
but in a similar spirit, Marjorie Kornhauser proposed in 2005 that the IRS provide
taxpayers with an annual statement of their income tax burden, similar to the
statement we receive annually from the Social Security Administration.181 This
statement would highlight key data, such as gross income, deductions, taxable
income, and credits and provide and explain the difference between the taxpayer's
average rate and MTR.18 2 In some ways, the government-provided or subsidized tax
planning software envisioned here is a high-tech extension of Kornhauser's proposal,
but a potentially important and powerful extension.
A. FurtherDevelopment/Prolferationof Tax PlanningSoftware Likely is
Inevitable
Given the increasing complexity of the Code, the increasing power and decreasing
cost of technology, and the amount of money (and leisure) at stake, it is probably
inevitable that tax software vendors will continue to develop and market planning
software. In fact, it is surprising that sophisticated tax planning software is not
currently marketed to high-income individuals. Intuit, for example, offers such
software to professional preparers through its Lacerte line, but offers nothing
comparable to individuals utilizing its TurboTax line of products. 183
Why is this? The answer has to be that individual purchasers of tax preparation
software don't yet demand this kind of analysis. Perhaps taxpayers who want this
information receive it indirectly from professional preparers. And, indeed, there must
be demand for these services by the clients of professional preparers, or Lacerte,
Drake, CCH, and the other vendors of professional tax software would not include
these features in their products either.
Meanwhile, a number of technologically savvy commentators envision a future in
which technology will have a much more dramatic influence on tax and other areas
of the law. Ben Alarie, for example, predicts that technological advances will lead to
increasing democratization of the law as lower costs of producing information will
184
make it less expensive to understand legal rights and obligations.
If this is right, if we are approaching "legal singularity" in Alarie's evocative
phrasing, 185 then the costs associated with functional transparency-principally
increased excess burden and cheating-may be largely unavoidable. If so, the
important questions have to do with who shapes the innovation and for whose
benefit.

180. See Rosenberg, supra note 179, at 51.
181. Marjorie Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information
Increase Compliance?, 18 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 95, 106-07 (2005).
182. See id. at 107-08.
183. TurboTax offers Free, Deluxe, Premium, and Self-Employed editions, which are
increasingly costly. The higher-end products tackle increasingly complicated tasks, such as
dealing with securities transactions, but none offer the "what if' scenario analysis found in
Lacerte. See TurboTax, supra note 162.

184. Alarie et al., supra note 178, at 426.
185. Id. at 443.
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B. Tax PlanningSoftware Could Be Designed to Advance Government Policies
Commercial tax planning software will be designed to maximize revenue for the
vendor, which likely translates into software that maximizes the utility of the
software's end users. There is no reason that vendors would take into account overall
social welfare in designing such software, but the government could. This Section
highlights several ways in which government-provided or subsidized tax planning
software could focus on meeting government and social welfare objectives that
commercial products might not.
1. Increasing the Efficacy of Tax Incentives
The Code contains numerous clear-cut tax incentives aimed at individual
taxpayers. 186 Given the complexity and opacity of the Code, many taxpayers are
unaware of these incentives or fail to take full advantage. For example, 20% of
taxpayers eligible for the EITC fail to claim the credit, primarily because they fail to
file returns. 187 As Jacob Goldin notes, incomplete EITC take-up means that many
individuals fail to receive the EITC tax benefit and, in all likelihood, "at least some
individuals are not aware of the pro-work incentives the credit creates, and hence,
work less than they would if they were to take the credit's incentives into account." 188
Presumably, Congress would prefer full take-up and more effective incentives. 189
Because EITC-eligible taxpayers who file returns typically use professional
preparers or tax preparation software that ensures that the taxpayer will receive her
full credit, Goldin argues that "efforts to increase EITC take-up should focus on
inducing EITC-eligible individuals to file a tax return."190
This prescription makes sense as a means of ensuring that individuals receive the
EITC to which they are entitled, but encouraging filing alone would not ensure that
individuals understand and respond to the EITC's work incentives. Suppose, for
example, that a federal EITC-capable prepopulated return system was to be
established. Such a system would largely mitigate computational complexity and
ensure payment of full EITC benefits to workers with W-2 earnings reported to the
IRS, 191 but it would not provide the information that individuals need to make
informed decisions about work effort. It would not even ensure that EITC recipients
were aware of the credit at all.
In order to ensure that tax incentives are as effective as possible, individuals need
to be made aware of the incentives and brought to understand how their potential

186. See supra text accompanying notes 92-102.

187. Goldin, supra note 22, at 60-61, 70.
188. Id. at 66.
189. The government spends hundreds of millions of dollars a year on EITC outreach and
enforcement. See Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, PsychologicalFrictionsand the
Incomplete Take-up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 105 AM.

ECON. REv. 3489, 3523 (2015) (reporting that Congress appropriated $716 million in 1997 for
EITC outreach and enforcement over a five-year period).
190. Goldin, supra note 22, at 107.
191. Workers with self-employment income not reported to the government by third parties
would not be issued prepopulated returns and might continue to miss out on the EITC.
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responses to the incentives would affect their after-tax income. Governmentprovided or subsidized planning software could (1) alert individuals that they are or
may be eligible for various incentives, and (2) allow these individuals to quickly and
easily calculate the after-tax income associated with their potential responses to the
incentive.
If a taxpayer can be induced to use government-provided or subsidized tax
planning software that accesses her tax return data, the first step-alerting the
taxpayer as to incentive eligibility-is fairly trivial. The software could be designed
to determine whether, based on her reported income and other reported
characteristics, e.g., number and age of dependent children, the taxpayer is eligible
or close to being eligible for the various discrete federal income tax incentives-the
EITC, education credits, retirement credits, etc. And the software presumably could
be designed to make these determinations automatically and prompt the taxpayer
without the need for an affirmative inquiry. 19 2
To be sure, simply making such software available does not solve the particular

EITC take-up problem highlighted by Goldin. EITC-eligible individuals who fail to
file returns are unlikely to utilize tax planning software to determine how much
money they are leaving on the table. It is conceivable, although somewhat big
brother-ish, that the IRS would use third-party reported income data to alert nonfilers as to the possibility that they would be eligible for the EITC and direct them to
simple tax planning software that would provide a more definitive answer. 193
The second step-associating potential responses to incentives with after-tax
income-falls squarely within the domain of current professional tax planning
software and specifically "what if' scenario analysis and can clearly be accomplished
with current technology. 194 In the EITC example, the software could provide the
taxpayer with her current tax credit based on her current income and with the credit
she would receive if her income were to increase or decrease by, say, 10%.
Of course, there are potential downsides to such a program. Continuing with the
EITC example, first, total EITC benefits would likely increase, but to the extent that
this is a product of greater work effort, we should count this as a feature, not a bug.
Second, making it easier for taxpayers to understand how the EITC works could

192. Sophisticated tax planning software products marketed to professional taxpayers
today automatically conduct these sorts of analyses and provide alerts. E.g. Tax PlannerPro,
INTUIT,
https://quickbooks.intuit.com/app/apps/appdetails/taxplanner/en-us/
[https://perma.cc/QP43-EDJX]; Lacerte Tax, INTUIT, https://proconnect.intuit.com/lacerte/

[https://perma.cc/C3NW-G35R] (including a deduction finder); ProConnect Tax, INTUIT,
https://proconnect.intuit.com/tax-online/ [https://perma.cc/UR85-PCTS] (using pop-ups to
show

potential

deductions

or credits);

https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/checkpoint
WOLTERS

KLUWER,

Checkpoint Products, THOMSON REUTERS,

[https://perma.cc/E33Q-RR67];

Tax Software,

https://taxna.wolterskluwer.com/professional-tax-software/atx

[https://perma.cc/A32E-BW6T].
193. Again, this process would not assist taxpayers eligible for the EITC based on income
from self-employment that is not reported to the IRS by third parties. Although not directly
responsive to the non-filer problem, combining government-provided or subsidized planning
software with tax preparation software could increase use generally and provide a platform for
providing taxpayers with income and tax scenarios generated automatically. See infra
Subsection F.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 168-170.
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increase cheating. If it is easier for an EITC recipient to determine the income level
that maximizes her credit in her particular situation, she may be more likely to report
that level of income. Third, as Goldin notes, some behavioral responses increase
deadweight loss; in this case, that would include the negative impact of the EITC
phase-out on work incentives. 195 I will address these concerns in subsequent sections.
2. Highlighting Cases in Which MTR is Less than the Statutory Rate
While tax expenditure provisions more often result in MTRs exceeding statutory
rates because of phase-outs, there are cases in which the opposite is true and when it
would be in the interest of the taxpayer and society for the taxpayer to recognize this
situation and increase her labor supply. Government planning software could be
designed to expressly highlight these situations and illustrate to the taxpayer that her
after-tax income may be a larger fraction of pre-tax income than she had realized.
One example of this phenomenon, of course, is the EITC phase-in that we have just
discussed.196 In the EITC phase-in range, taxpayers' MTRs are significantly lower
than statutory rates. 197 Taxpayers who fail to understand this and believe their tax
rate to be the statutory rate (or in some cases the highest statutory rate, which may
be more salient) may be leaving money on the table personally and creating needless
deadweight loss.
At the opposite end of the income spectrum, AMT paying taxpayers who are not
subject to the AMT exemption phase-out (because the phase-out has not been
triggered or because their exemptions have been fully phased out) also likely face an
MTR that is less than their statutory rate.198 Again, both individual utility and social
welfare are improved if these taxpayers are made aware of the lower MTR and
respond accordingly. Simple tax planning software can alert taxpayers to these
circumstances and illustrate the relationship between pre- and post-tax income,
correcting misperceptions and increasing social welfare.
3. Not Highlighting Cases in Which MTR Exceeds the Statutory Rate
What about situations in which a taxpayer's MTR exceeds her statutory rate? This
will commonly be the case for taxpayers whose itemized deductions are curtailed by
a floor or whose income places them in the phase-out range for one or more
provisions such as the EITC, the AMT, education credits, etc. In these cases, a
taxpayer who understood her true MTR might work less than she would under the
mistaken belief that her statutory rate was her MTR, improving her personal utility
but increasing the aggregate deadweight loss from taxation. Presumably,
commercially available software would treat the two cases-cases in which the MTR
exceeds the statutory rate and cases in which the MTR is less than the statutory ratesymmetrically, promoting individual utility maximization in both cases and ignoring

195. See Goldin, supra note 22, at 62.

196.
197.
198.
regular

Another example is the refundable portion of the child tax credit. See supra note 116.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-116.
Recall that the nominal rates under the AMT are less than the highest rates under the
income tax. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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social welfare. Must government-provided or subsidized software take the same
tack? Probably, but not necessarily. Let me elaborate.
Clearly, the government cannot misrepresent the tax laws to taxpayers. If a
taxpayer in a phase-out range uses government software to determine the marginal
impact of additional income, the software must provide the correct answer. But must
the software prompt the taxpayer that her income places her in a phase-out range and,
as a result, her MTR may be higher than she realizes? The argument that the software
must alert the taxpayer would likely be grounded in an implicit promise that the
software would promote individual optimization. Some might argue that if the
software alerts taxpayers to incentives that benefit the government and society, in
fairness, it must highlight incentives that do not benefit the government and society.
But there are at least two possible counterarguments. First, the IRS could simply
disclaim any such obligation. Taxpayers would not be bound to use the IRS's
software, and the software could clearly indicate what it is designed to do and not to
do. Second, in some cases, the symmetry may be false. Explicit tax expenditures,
such as the EITC, education credits, retirement incentives, and the like, which the
government would want to affirmatively highlight, are different in kind than the
phase-out of the AMT exemption amounts, which is, in effect, a rate adjustment. To
be sure, some would argue that the government's obligation to highlight hidden tax
rate adjustments, such as the phase-out of AMT exemptions, personal exemptions,
or itemized deductions, should actually be greater, but the government has never
been obligated to highlight the impact of these phase-outs and it is not clear why
government provision or subsidization of planning software would impose such an
obligation.199
Ultimately, however, I suspect that the asymmetric treatment of tax incentives and
disincentives would be a nonstarter politically and thus untenable. And there is, to be
sure, one other constraint on the IRS's ability to shape tax planning software to serve
social welfare instead of personal welfare. Use of this software would be voluntary.
If taxpayers, specifically high-income taxpayers, do not believe that the
government's software serves their interests, they can purchase a commercial
product, or given the current dearth of sophisticated planning software marketed to
individuals, consult a tax professional for advice. 200
Given this reality, and in order to avoid facilitating social welfare reducing
planning by high-income taxpayers, the better and more achievable course might be
to target government-provided or subsidized planning software at low-income
taxpayers. The following Sections provide other potential justifications for such
targeting.

199. I use the personal exemption, itemized deduction, and AMT exemption phase-outs as
familiar examples recognizing that the first two are currently inapplicable and that the AMT
and AMT exemption phase-outs currently apply to only a very small number of taxpayers.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70 (discussing planning features included in
software marketed to professional preparers).
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C. IRS Provision or Subsidization of Tax PlanningSoftware Could Improve
Distribution
As noted above, while vendors do not market sophisticated tax planning software
to individual taxpayers, they do market such software to professional preparers who
presumably use these features in advising their clients. 201 Reliance on professional
preparers is not limited to high-income taxpayers. Principally, because of the
complexity of the EITC, many low-income taxpayers turn to professionals, as well.
Logic and intuition suggest, however, that high-income clients would make greater
use of scenario planning services offered by their preparers than low-income clients
because more dollars would generally be at stake and because high-income taxpayers
would be better able to pay for additional planning services beyond simple tax
preparation.
If this is an accurate portrayal, this pattern would be troubling from a
distributional perspective. High-income taxpayers who receive and act on accurate
information about the tax consequences of their life decisions will make more utilityenhancing decisions than low-income taxpayers who fail to utilize these services. By
providing free or subsidized planning software to low-income taxpayers, the IRS

could level this playing field.
In recent work, Manoj Viswanathan argues that the IRS should support lowincome tax planning. 202 He argues that low-income tax planning is more likely to be
welfare enhancing than high-income planning and that, even when it isn't, it's unfair
for low-income taxpayers not to be able to plan when high-income taxpayers do.203
Viswanathan notes that the Jobs Act introduced complex provisions that apply to
low-income taxpayers, such as § 199A, and he encourages the IRS to sponsor
programs to advise these taxpayers ex ante. 204 Government provision or subsidization
of simple, user-friendly tax planning software to low-income taxpayers would be
perfectly consistent with this effort.
But there may be an even stronger argument for government provision or
subsidization of planning software to low-income individuals. Given numerous
phase-outs of tax expenditures targeted at lower-income taxpayers, the Code may be
more of a black box for these taxpayers than for middle- and upper-income
taxpayers. 25 So the need may be greater. Moreover, while I support the adoption of

201. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
202. Viswanathan, supra note 122, at 195.

203. Id. at 203.
204. Id. at 210-11 (suggesting, for example, that law school clinics "could and should
provide tax planning assistance for lower-income taxpayers beyond what [low-income tax
preparation assistance] centers currently provide").
205. Low-income taxpayers are often eligible for non-tax direct benefits, such as housing
and nutrition assistance, that are based on need and are reduced with increasing income. See
POLICY BASICS: THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP), CTR. ON

BUDGET

&

POL'Y

PRIORITIES,

atoms/files/policybasics-foodstamps.pdf

https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/

[https://perma.cc/8NKX-ERQE]

(2019) (detailing

gradual phase-out of SNAP benefits with earnings); Policy Basics: FederalRentalAssistance,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basics-

federal-rental-assistance [https://perma.cc/C6FV-AQBD] (Jan. 11, 2022) (noting that most
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pre-populated return programs, I recognize that if these programs become reality, the
Code will become even more of a black box for the typically lower-income taxpayers
who would be eligible to participate, again increasing the need and justification for
government-provided or subsidized planning software.
D. Getting the IRS into the Tax PreparationSoftware Game
In 2002, the IRS entered into the Free Online Electronic Tax Filing Agreement
with the Free File Alliance, a collection of vendors of tax preparation software
products. 206 The vendors committed to providing free tax preparation and filing
software through the IRS's website for 60% of U.S. taxpayers. 20 7 The IRS committed
to staying out of the tax preparation software business. Although the term of the
agreement has been extended several times, 208 the program has not lived up to
expectations. A recent report issued by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration found that only 2.4% of 104 million eligible taxpayers utilized the
program and filed their returns for free, while 33.2% of these taxpayers filed using
Alliance members' commercial software products. 209 One reason for a lack of
taxpayer participation, the Inspector General found, was that some Free File Alliance
members edited the code in their Free File web pages to ensure that taxpayers
searching the internet for free return filing would not find the members' Free File
page.210 More generally, the Inspector General attributed this low level of
participation in the Free File program to "complexity, confusion, and lack of taxpayer
awareness about [the program's] operation and requirements." 21 1
Undoubtedly, integrated tax-preparation and tax-planning software is more
efficient and effective than stand-alone products. Perhaps this is the moment for the
IRS to abandon the Free File Program and get into the tax-preparation software
game.21 2 The IRS could provide tax preparation software as well as planning software

participating households pay 30% of their income for rent and utilities with the balance coming
from federal rental assistance). An ideal planning tool for low-income individuals would
include these non-tax programs as well, but a tool incorporating income tax provisions alone
would be a good first step.
206. Memorandum from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on IRS Oversight
of Free File Program 1
(June 9,
2020), https://www.portman.senate.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-06/90FEC84C7C59179A55F309CD0CA45225.psi-staff-memo-freefile.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D4N-H8F7].
207. Id. at 1.
208. Id. at 1-2 (noting that the 2005 extension expanded coverage to 70% of taxpayers).
209.

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2020-40-009,

INSUFFICIENT

OVERSIGHT

OF THE FREE

FILE PROGRAM

RESULT IN

COMPLEXITY AND
Low

TAXPAYER

PARTICIPATION 4-5 (2020).

210. Id. at 9-10.
211.

TREASURY INSPECTOR

INSUFFICIENT

OVERSIGHT

GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN.,

OF THE FREE

HIGHLIGHTS:

FILE PROGRAM

RESULT IN

COMPLEXITY AND
Low

TAXPAYER

PARTICIPATION (2020), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2020reports/
202040009_oahighlights.html [https://perma.cc/87LJ-JTGP].
212. The timing may also be propitious as Intuit announced in July 2021 that it would leave
the Free File Program at the end of the tax filing season in October 2021. Justin Elliott & Paul
Kiel, TurboTax-Maker Intuit Will Leave Free Tax FilingPartnershipwith IRS, PROPUBLICA
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targeted at lower-income taxpayers who, phase-ins and phase-outs aside, typically
face less complex tax situations.21 3 The combination of products would focus on
achieving accurate compliance but also promoting functional transparency of the tax
system, particularly for low-income taxpayers who are less likely to have access to
affordable commercial services.2 4
E. The Costs of Government-Providedor Subsidized Tax PlanningSoftware
Part III of this Article described several positive aspects of increased complexity
and opacity-supporting a more accurate tax system, reducing distortions in taxpayer
behavior and deadweight loss, and reducing cheating. Effective governmentprovided or subsidized planning software that restored functional transparency
would undermine the second and third of these benefits of complexity, resulting in
greater deadweight loss and more cheating.
To be sure, these downsides are not unique to government planning software.
Commercial planning software already exists that implicates these costs. But by
definition, if government-provided or subsidized software achieves greater
penetration, more taxpayers will understand and presumably act upon the various
incentives embedded in the Code, some by reducing work effort when they realize
that their MTR is significantly higher than they believed, some by misreporting
income from self-employment in order to maximize receipt of tax benefits. These,
then, are the behavioral costs of government software. Obviously, there would be
additional costs of software development, promulgation, and maintenance, all of
which would be reduced if government software is provided to or subsidized for
lower-income taxpayers only.
F. FurtherPotentialObjections to Government-Providedor Subsidized Tax
PlanningSoftware
This subsection addresses three potential objections to government-provided or
subsidized tax planning software directed towards lower income taxpayers.
1. Why Should the Government Intervene? Why Not Leave This to the Market?
Economists generally disfavor government intervention absent some market
failure or externality.21" Arguably there is an externality here, which is protecting or
advancing the legitimacy of the tax system. If taxpayers do not understand, even from

(July 16, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/turbotax-maker-intuit-will-leave-free-taxfiling-partnership-with-irs [https://perma.cc/K6S5-3NT5].
213. Whether the IRS creates tax preparation software or not, any IRS planning software
should be designed to receive data directly from commercial preparation products such as
TurboTax.
214. See Rosenberg, supra note 179 (advocating IRS promulgation of tax preparation
software focused on achieving accurate compliance).
215. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, in THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS ("Most economic arguments for government intervention are

based on the idea that the marketplace cannot provide public goods or handle externalities.").
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a functional perspective, the relationship between their life decisions and their tax
burden, they may become demoralized with the tax system, and compliance may fall
as a result.
Externalities aside, one may also view it to be a moral obligation of the
government to provide taxpayers with the tools to navigate an increasingly complex
tax system. As discussed in Subsection G, below, the IRS has embraced such a
commitment through its Taxpayer Bill of Rights.
2. Why Not Just Give Lower-Income Taxpayers Cash That They Can Use as They
Like (Instead of Software)?
If it isn't clear that lower-income taxpayers will value tax planning software,
providing or subsidizing that software could be wasteful. If so, some might argue, it
might be more efficient to provide cash to offset the disutility of tax complexity and
opacity. This line of argument is commonly encountered with respect to proposed
provision of benefits in kind, and there is certainly a large element of truth to it.216
One response, in this context and often others, is that it may well be more feasible
politically to provide in kind benefits rather than cash My intuition is that this factor
would be compelling in this instance-that politicians would much more readily
accept a program of government provision or subsidization of planning software
directed at addressing the complexity of the tax system they have wrought than
simply increasing cash subsidies to lower income citizens.
Moreover, to the extent that lower-income taxpayers who use the software
discover that they have previously over-estimated their tax burdens and increase their
labor supply (and tax payments) once they discover the truth, this shift in behavior
results in a social as well as a personal benefit. Cash transfers lack this feature.
3. Are Lower-Income Taxpayers Likely to Use Tax Planning Software Even If It is
Free?
What if we build it and they don't come? 2 The degree to which lower-income
taxpayers will utilize even free planning software is, of course, unknown. However,
several factors suggest that use could be considerable. Thinking hard about usage,
however, does lead to potentially important program design considerations.
Some potential users might refrain just because they lack interest or have better
or more important things to do with their time. Thus, it will obviously be important
to make the software as easy and convenient as possible. But this may not be enough.
It may be necessary to nudge taxpayers toward use. Nudging will be easiest if free
tax planning software is combined with free preparation software. Many lowerincome taxpayers must file a return to take advantage of the refundable portion of
the EITC. That should be sufficient enticement to get them to use the tax preparation
software. But once taxpayers are using the preparation software, the combined

216. See, e.g., Lester C. Thurow, Government Expenditures: Cash orIn-KindAid?, 5 PHIL.

& PUB. AFFAIRS 361 (1976) (arguing that cash transfers dominate in-kind aid except in the
case of pure public goods).
217. Paraphrasing an often misquoted line from "Field of Dreams."
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planning software could, for example, generate automated planning scenarios. For
example, the software could automatically provide a taxpayer qualifying for the
EITC with scenarios demonstrating how much they will take home after tax if they
earn, say, 5% or 10% more money the following tax year. This consideration weighs
strongly in favor of combined planning and preparation software.
Other taxpayers might be deterred from using IRS-issued planning (and perhaps
even preparation) software by fear of government intrusion and misuse of their
personal financial data. If most lower-income taxpayers place greater trust in
Intuit/TurboTax than in the federal government, which may seem perverse, but
possible, this consideration might suggest government subsidy rather than
government provision of combined preparation/planning software, despite the
arguments to the contrary highlighted above.2 18
Finally, it is worth recognizing that in general the populace is becoming ever more
comfortable managing their lives online. Comfort levels with either subsidized
private software or government-provided software seem likely to rise over time.
G. Summing Up the Case for Targeting Government-ProvidedPlanningSoftware
at Lower-Income Taxpayers
In sum, while the government could endeavor to provide or subsidize tax planning
software for all taxpayers, high-income taxpayers already have access to commercial
planning software through professional preparers and the resources to command
these services. The need is greater at the lower end of the income spectrum.
Moreover, increasing functional transparency through the provision of planning
software will likely lead to greater deadweight loss, particularly at the higher end of
the income spectrum, as, absent transparency, high-income taxpayers tend to
underestimate their MTRs as a result of various deduction and credit floors and
phase-outs. To be sure, increasing functional transparency for lower-income
taxpayers will also increase deadweight loss in some cases, but not in all cases given
various phase-in provisions applicable to low-income taxpayers. Weighing the costs
and benefits suggests that targeting government-provided or subsidized planning
software at low-income taxpayers may be the most sensible path forward.
VI. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF PLANNING SOFTWARE AS A RESPONSE TO TAX
COMPLEXITY

As I've argued above, technological responses to tax complexity are probably
inevitable. Indeed, they exist today for some taxpayers, and one would think that
their use would increase as tax complexity grows and the cost of technology falls. If
so, the important questions going forward are (1) who gets to shape these responses
-the government or private parties? And (2) who will be in a position to take
advantage of this technology-all taxpayers or just high-income taxpayers who can

afford the bill?

218. See supra Part V.D. (discussing the failure of the Free File Alliance and the rationale
for government provision of combined preparation and planning software).
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For the moment, however, let's envision a world in which planning softwarecommercial and/or government-provided-is widely available and broadly used,
creating functional transparency for many taxpayers. I have discussed the
implications for tax efficiency and distribution, but other questions remain. Does the
functional transparency generated by planning software address all of the concerns
created by complexity?
Joshua Blank and Leigh Osofsky have noted that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights
commits the IRS to a certain level of transparency, a commitment that in their view
is not being met today.219 Would government provision or subsidization of planning
software meet this commitment? Does this commitment require that taxpayers be
able to understand how phase-outs work or is it sufficient that they be able to easily
associate life decisions with their tax burden? Is functional transparency, in other
words, sufficient to meet the IRS's commitment? Although the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights speaks of the right to "clear explanations of the laws," which might suggest a
sort of granular clarity, the underlying commitment is to a right to be informed.2 20 In
my view, the kind of functional transparency that can be achieved through the
sophisticated tax planning software I've described above should be sufficient to meet
that commitment.
Other complexity-related concerns lie in the political and philosophical spheres.
Would widespread availability of planning software sufficiently address the
democratization, political accountability, and autonomy concerns arising from
complexity and opacity? Would government-provided or subsidized software more
adequately address these concerns than leaving all of this to the marketplace? Is it a
sufficient response to these concerns that taxpayers can readily associate life
decisions with tax burdens even if they do not choose (or perhaps pay) to do so?
Again, I would think that functional transparency created through planning
software would constitute a sufficient response to these concerns, but I am somewhat
less confident here. Take political accountability, for example. One concern is that
policy makers can raise taxes surreptitiously by, for example, phasing out deductions,
and thus avoid the ire of taxpayers who are hoodwinked into thinking that their
MTRs, and perhaps average rates, are lower than they are in reality. With planning
software, taxpayers can easily determine their true MTR and average rate, and those
who do so would not be hoodwinked. But even if free, easy, and effective planning
software were readily available, would taxpayers use the software to figure this out?
Software makes it easier for an interested citizen to cut through the opacity but does
nothing to combat the persistent misapprehensions of the lazy taxpayer-voter in the
face of surreptitious tax increases.221

219. Blank & Osofsky, supra note 146, at 194, 199 (arguing that IRS publications engage
in "simplexity," simplified descriptions that "have the unintended effect of obscuring
individuals' knowledge of the underlying tax law").
220. Taxpayer Bill of Rights: 1: The Right to be Informed, IRS (2020),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-1-the-right-to-be-informed-0
[https://perma.cc/2USP-D5WY].
221. Perhaps, however, journalists or other intermediaries could use planning software to
educate taxpayers and voters who lack the motivation to do the analyses themselves.
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Not all commentators are concerned with exploitation of tax provisions with low
political salience. 2 2 2 But if one shares these concerns, one might fairly conclude that
planning software has greater promise as a tool for addressing the adverse impact of
complexity on decision making and tax incentives than on political accountability
and the size of government.
CONCLUSION

Our complex and opaque tax system has been described as a black box. In reality,
it is more of a gray translucent box. The black box label is appropriately placed on
algorithms derived from the application of machine learning to big data. The
algorithms are said to flow from a black box because "they discern patterns and make
predictions in a way that cannot be intuitively understood or explained in the same
way as conventional analysis can be." 2 2 3
Our tax system is complex and opaque, but it is not like a machine learning black
box. The result of any tax calculation can be explained if one is willing to take the
time and make the effort. 224 But individual Code provisions and the interplay of
provisions can be extraordinarily complicated. And while compliance is made
manageable by the use of tax preparation software and professional preparers (and
possibly in the future by distribution of pre-populated returns), these "solutions" may
leave taxpayers in the dark with respect to the underlying tax law.
I have argued that planning software can be used to restore functional
transparency to the Code, alerting taxpayers to various tax incentives and allowing
taxpayers to associate their life decisions with tax burdens. This is a different type of
transparency than that which purportedly existed in the prior "golden age" when tax
rules were simple, individuals filled out their own returns by hand, and taxpayers
learned about tax by doing their taxes, and in some ways, functional transparency is
superior.
But I have also argued that there are costs and benefits to creating this functional
transparency because there are benefits as well as costs to complexity and opacity.
Be that as it may, such software exists today, and its use will only increase as
complexity increases and as high-income taxpayers realize what's at stake.
I have also made the case for government provision or subsidization of tax
planning (and preparation) software that would be targeted at low-income taxpayers
in order to address the particular complexities of taxation at the low end of the income
spectrum and level the tax planning playing field between high- and low-income

222. See supra note 149.
223. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71
ADMIN L. REV. 1, 14 (2019).

224. This is not to suggest that there are no ambiguities in the tax rules applicable to
individual taxpayers. It may be ambiguous, for example, whether a certain gig economy
worker is an employee or an independent contractor, and that determination has important tax
and other legal consequences. See e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can SharingBe Taxed?,
93 WASH. U. L. REv. 989, 1019 (2016); see also, Blank & Osofsky, supra note 146 (explaining
that the IRS often presents complex and ambiguous tax questions as simple and clear cut).
However, the computational complexity associated with floors, phase-ins and phase-outs, and
the AMT does not arise from ambiguity.
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taxpayers, while avoiding facilitating social welfare reducing tax planning by highincome taxpayers.
Some have argued that technology led us to the complex and opaque tax system
we have today. 225 The primary argument of this Article is that technology can help
supply the remedy as well as the injury.

225. See Zelenak, supranote 35.
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APPENDIX

1.
2.

Tax Software
Abacus
ATX- Wolters Kluwer

Website
http://abacus.tax/
cchsfs.com

3.
4.

Bloomberg Law: Tax
Blue J Legal

bloomberglaw.com/product/tax
www.bluejlegal.com

5.
6.
7.

BNA Income Tax Planner (Calc-QTax)
CCH Access Tax-Wolters Kluwer
CCH ProSystemfx-Wolters Kluwer

8.

Checkpoint-Thomson Reuters

9. Clams R+D
10. Comtax
11. Credit Karma
12. Drake Software
13. EZ Tax Return

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

FreeTaxUSA
Genius Software
GoSystem Rs-Thomson Reuters
H&R Block
inDinero
Jackson Hewitt

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Lacerte-Intuit
Liberty Tax
Online Taxes
OneSource-Thomson Reuters
Petz Crossling

25. PowerTax
26. ProConnect Tax-Intuit
27. ProSeries Cloud Hosting

www.bna.com/tax
cchgroup.com
https://taxna.wolterskluwer.com/professionaltax-software/prosystem-fx
tax.thomsonreuters.com/checkpoint
clarusrd.com
https://www.comtaxit.com/
creditkarma.com
drakesoftware.com
https://www.6.eztaxreturn.com/scriptsez/start.
exe/eztax/p/alliance2020/start.html?r_link=w
ww.eztaxreturn.com
freetaxusa.com
https://saginfotech.com/
tax.thomsonreuters.com/gosystem
hrblock.com
indinero.com
https://www.jacksonhewitt.com/
proconnect.intuit.com/lacerte
libertytax.com
OLT.com
tax.thomsonreuters.com/onesource/tax
http://www.crosslinktax.com
http://www.powertaxsolution.com/
proconnect.intuit.com
https://proconnect.intuit.com/proseries/

28. QuickBooks-TaxPlanner Pro

https://quickbooks.intuit.com/app/apps/appdet
ails/taxplanner/en-us/

29. Redwing Software

https://www.redwingsoftware.com/home/hom
e.aspx

30. Sage50-Cloud

https://www.sage.com/en-us/products/sage-

50cloud/
31. TaxAct
32. Taxfyle

ww.taxact.com
https://taxfyle.com
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33. Taxmaster
34. TaxSlayer-Professional
35. TaxSlayer-Individual
36. Taxwise-Wolters Kluwer
37. TurboTax-TaxCaster
38. UltraTax CS-Thomson Reuters
39. VeriPlan
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http://www.taxmaster.com/
www.taxslayerpro.com
www.taxslayer.com
cchsfs.com
https://turbotax.intuit.com/taxtools/calculators/taxcaster/
tax.thomsonreuters.com/ultratax
http://www.theskilledinvestor.com/VeriPlan/

